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With Netflix promising 600 hours of original content in 2016 and Hulu revamping 
its original content slate, there exists a vast body of popular cultural criticism and news 
stories about online original television programming. However, academic literature on 
Netflix and Hulu is limited. This thesis provides a foundation for understanding the 
publicly constructed business models for two of the most prominent subscription video-
on-demand (SVOD) services, their origins, business strategies, and imagined audiences. 
Through discourse analysis of industry paratexts and trade press coverage this study 
reveals how Netflix and Hulu’s programming choices, branding strategies, marketing 
materials, and public rhetoric communicate and construct particular public business 
goals, models of success, and ideal audience engagement. It finds that Netflix and Hulu’s 
stakeholders have distinguished their brands in specific ways. Partially through the 
influence of various industry stakeholders, both platforms have adopted business 
 vi 
strategies from earlier forms of media (cable and broadcast), while also formulating 
particular constructions of audiences and adopting specific ways of engaging and 
sustaining those audiences. However, the companies have also manipulated new 
technologies, privileging fresh ways of measuring engagement, and promoting certain 
types of viewership behavior. The differing business decisions made by Hulu and Netflix, 
and the distinctive ways they convey such decisions to the press and public, have 
contributed to specific cultural narratives about legacy media companies, new 
technologies, the current state of television, the ongoing flux of media industries, and 
especially prized audience groups in the twenty-first century.  
 
 vii 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................... ix	
List of Figures .......................................................................................................... x	
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1	
Research Question and Significance of Project .............................................. 3	
Literature Review ........................................................................................... 5	
Television and New Media: Industry Studies ....................................... 6	
Branding Television .............................................................................. 8	
Audience and Fan Studies: Imagined Viewership ............................... 11	
Building on Mareike Jenner’s Scholarship .......................................... 19	
Methods ........................................................................................................ 22	
Historical Context: Video-On-Demand and Netflix/Hulu  
Pre-Original Content .................................................................................... 25	
Chapter One:	Complement or Competition? How Netflix and  
Hulu’s Stakeholders Shape Cultural Understandings of the Platforms ................. 32 
Building Out Subscription Options: Hulu Plus and Netflix Streaming ........ 35	
Ownership/Partnership: Netflix Vs. Hulu .................................................... 41	
Original Series Origins: From Experimentation to Expansion ..................... 44	
Competitors: Netflix and Hulu “Pouring Fuel on the Fire” ......................... 53	
Trade Press and Critics Respond .................................................................. 59	
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 64	
Chapter Two:	“Something for Everybody”: Imagining  
Netflix and Hulu’s Audiences ............................................................................... 65	
Audiences/Viewers/Users/Fans/Subscribers ................................................ 70	
Imagining Audiences: Audiences as Data .................................................... 74	
Imagining Audiences: Audiences as Subscribers ......................................... 79	
Imagining Audiences: Advertising Agencies ............................................... 83	
Theorizing Watching Behaviors ................................................................... 86	
How Competitors Define Netflix Viewership .............................................. 89	
 viii 
How Netflix Defines Success ....................................................................... 93	
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 96	
Chapter Three:	Building Business Models, Brand Strategies,  
and Subscriber Bases: Two Approaches ............................................................... 98	
Literature Review: Branding Television .................................................... 100	
Netflix Vs. Hulu Brand Strategies .............................................................. 103	
Advertising Created for Advertising Agencies .......................................... 106	
Advertising Content for Subscribers .......................................................... 109	
Advertising Platforms ................................................................................. 113	
Original Content Acquisition and Platform-Constructed Narratives ......... 117	
Social Media Engagement: Cultivating Acceptable Fan Practices ... 122	





List of Tables 
Table 1: Hulu’s Timeline and Key Players ........................................................... 35	
Table 2: Netflix Timeline and Key Players ........................................................... 38	
Table 3: Number of New Netflix Original Series, Films, and Specials Premiered  
from 2012-2016 ..................................................................................................... 48	
 x 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Hulu Plus Paid Subscribers .................................................................... 81	
Figure 2: Hulu Reaches Millennials .................................................................... 107	
Figure 3: Netflix Originals Cover Art Example .................................................. 111	
Figure 4: The Mindy Project’s Official Webpage on Fox.com ........................... 125	
Figure 5: OITNB Labor Day Binge Advertising Campaign ................................ 131	






Anywhere, Anytime (2007-present) 
For the Love of TV (2014) 
Come TV with us (2015) 
-Hulu Company Slogans 
 
Hulu’s three company slogans, provided above, offer a place to begin a study of 
the streaming online media company’s perception of their service as well as the ways 
they have worked to acquire, hook, and sustain particular audiences. The three slogans 
collectively emphasize portability and personalization, ease of scheduling, a prioritization 
of television content (though the service also has a film library), and an affective 
relationship with TV. Two of the three slogans clearly demonstrate Hulu’s corporate ties 
to television and linear TV companies [the platform is owned by conglomerate parents, 
Disney (ABC), Comcast (NBC), and 21st Century Fox].  
Meanwhile, Netflix, a service frequently compared to Hulu yet possessing a larger 
subscription base1, does not have an official slogan. Though they have used the phrase 
“Discover New Stories” on billboards, Netflix’s lack of an official company slogan is 
revealing in terms of the clarity and scope of their business model and branding goals: 
personalization. There is no “one size fits all” slogan that could encompass the 
                                                
1 Hulu last released subscriber numbers in February 2015. The company had nine million U.S.  
subscribers. Comparably, in February 2015, Netflix had 60 million global subscribers, 40 million of those 
in the United States. Reed Hastings and David Wells, “Q1 15 Letter to Shareholders,” April 15, 2015, 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NFLX/692972882x0x821407/DB785B50-90FE-44DA-9F5B-
37DBF0DCD0E1/Q1_15_Earnings_Letter_final_tables.pdf; Joan Solsman, “Hulu Closes in on 9 Million 
Subscribers,” CNET, April 29, 2015, http://www.cnet.com/news/hulu-closes-in-on-9-million-paid-
subscribers/. 
 2 
company’s goals and coverage. Netflix sells “stories,” not “TV” or “film” exclusively. 
And, unlike Hulu, a service only available in the U.S., Netflix brands these stories at a 
global level, aiming to be the first “global Internet TV network.”2 Discovering the range 
of content Netflix has to offer is part of the service’s value proposition, engaging 
potential and current subscribers with the platform, widespread availability, and the 
breadth of content. The aforementioned slogans for Hulu – and lack thereof for Netflix – 
point to a key theme emphasized throughout this thesis: these two companies’ business 
models and branding strategies contribute to convey distinct, carefully formulated 
messages about the streaming television industry and conceptions of audiences. Through 
case studies of the public messaging of subscription video-on-demand (SVOD) platforms 
Netflix and Hulu, with a particular emphasis on how this messaging connects to their 
original programs, I illustrate how two of the most prominent American SVOD platforms 
promote themselves and situate their original programming within their evolving business 
plans. In doing so, I find the discourse speaks to wider concerns across the media 
industry more generally, including: how new technologies and different business models 
threaten legacy media companies (television broadcast and cable companies), and how 
the industry and popular discourse about audiences and SVODs contribute to wider 
cultural narratives.  
                                                
2 “Netflix is Now Available Around the World,” Netflix, January 6, 2016, 
https://media.netflix.com/en/press-releases/netflix-is-now-available-around-the-world. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PROJECT 
This thesis poses three primary research questions: First, how have SVODs 
constructed and revised their American business models from 2007-2016? Second, how 
have SVODs presented themselves to various audiences and stakeholders including 
journalists, critics, industry practitioners, and current and potential subscribers? 
Developing from these questions, and ultimately, what are some of the cultural and 
industrial implications of these presentations? 
 To address the questions posed above, I look at the business origins of Netflix 
and Hulu and determine dominant industrial and journalistic discourses. Trade and 
journalistic press, advertisements, press releases, and industrial business documents 
partially reveal how the platforms construct their public image. These paratexts uncover 
the publicly conveyed goals of each platform, determining what constitutes success, and 
how success is measured for SVOD platforms. Paratexts, as defined by Jonathan Gray, 
are marketing and promotional materials that contribute to discourse surrounding a 
show.3 Paratexts can add meaning to the text to which they refer. These discourses also 
construct an idea of competition among SVODs as these businesses attempt to 
differentiate themselves from other SVODs, VODs, and linear television; win and sustain 
subscribers; increase user engagement; and generate content to compete with legacy 
television networks. Then, I track the ways audiences have been imagined and addressed 
via public discourse (trade press, interviews with SVOD officers and directors, and 
journalistic press) and through business practices (advertising, marketing materials, and 
                                                
 3 Jonathan Gray, Show Sold Separately (New York: New York University Press, 2010). 
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press releases). This investigation investigates how streaming services brand original 
content to specific audience groups that have been constructed by these platforms. It 
points to priorities in viewer engagement, creating sustained subscriber relationships, and 
maintaining diverse content. I acknowledge I am only examining publicly available 
materials, which provides merely a sliver of information about business practices and 
strategies. However, as theorized by scholar John Caldwell and discussed in the 
methodology section, paratexts construct highly controlled narratives. Industry 
documents and trade press reveal industry vetted cultural discourse, relationships among 
industries and audiences, and trends in the modern television industry.  
In its attempts to address the issues posed above, this thesis surveys the business 
models of Netflix and Hulu from 2007 to 2016, using materials publicly provided by 
these companies as well as examining trade press and journalistic discourses surrounding 
their platforms. Building on this comparison of the two company’s business models, I 
then examine how the platforms envision and cater to the audiences they seek to attract 
and maintain. Through such analysis of these two streaming platform services, their 
marketing and branding strategies, and trade and journalistic materials, I hope to better 
understand the cultural and industrial discourses circulated around two mainstream 
nonlinear services and their audiences. In order to study the content, development, 
evolving popularity and cultural positioning of Netflix and Hulu, we first must have a 
clear sense of industrial status and history of SVOD platforms. This thesis seeks to 
provide a foundation for understanding the publicly constructed business models for two 
of the most prominent SVOD services and to consider how their origins and business 
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strategies – from content acquisitions to branding and marketing – have larger cultural 
and industrial stakes for television. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
While mass-market streaming platforms and the original programming they 
acquire and distribute are regularly discussed in the trades and popular presses, the 
academic literature specifically addressing such online original television content 
distributed by SVOD services is limited. Perhaps due to academic publishing schedules 
and the fact the first Netflix original series, House of Cards, did not debut until 2013, this 
remains a nascent but growing area of research. In order to create a rigorous research 
framework, this thesis draws on media studies scholarship from the last two decades and 
will be supported by scholarship on media industries (specifically addressing television 
and new media), branding and advertising theory, and audience studies research dating 
from the 1970s to the present. In the process of addressing my research questions, I will 
also work through key themes and incorporate concepts drawn from these subfields. 
Among the topics addressed include: how digital platforms are situated in relation to the 
evolving television industry; changing industrial conceptions of audiences in the post-
network era and beyond; the public construction of audiences by market researchers; and 
the ways that fans are engaged by nonlinear platforms. In the subsections below, I 
indicate how these key concepts and issues are drawn from the aforementioned bodies of 
literature. 
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Television and New Media: Industry Studies 
I build upon scholarship in television and new media studies that focuses on the 
acquisition and distribution of digital video content.  The work from which I draw is 
approached from a media industries perspective and related to my specific case studies on 
SVOD original television.4 In particular, Amanda Lotz’s work provides an important 
intervention, theorizing the changing landscape of television as connected to nonlinear 
services and fragmented audiences. She coins the term “post-network era,” defined as 
beginning in early 2000s and continuing into the present, when competitive industrial 
practices, like nonlinear access and cross-platform technologies, become too pronounced 
for many old, network and cable era practices to endure.5 The post-network era is 
distinguished in part by a greater prioritizing of “prized content” that viewers specifically 
have sought out and value.6 Prized content is one of three types of content Lotz describes, 
alongside “live sports and contests” and “linear content.” These latter content types she 
sees as primarily consumed live, not time-shifted by viewers.  
Prized content is especially pertinent to my work, as both Netflix and Hulu rely 
mainly upon time-shifted content. SVODs market themselves in part for their ability to 
give greater choice to viewers, and viewers must specifically “seek out” the content by 
subscribing to a certain platform. As applied to my argument, the post-network era that 
                                                
4 See Amanda Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized, Second Edition, (New York: NYU 
Press, 2014); Stuart Cunningham and Jon Silver, Screen Distribution and the New King Kongs of the 
Online World (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); Michael Curtin, Jennifer Holt, and Kevin Sanson, 
Distribution Revolution (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014); Jennifer Gillan, Television and 
New Media: Must-Click TV (New York: Routledge, 2011); Chuck Tryon, On-Demand Culture: Digital 
Delivery and the Future of Movies (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013). 
5 Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized, 8. 
6 Ibid., 12.  
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Lotz describes includes streaming platforms that increasingly rely on exclusive, original 
series, unavailable for consumption through other services. Netflix and Hulu hope to 
acquire and license prized content so users will specifically seek out their services. Lotz 
correctly cites that the goal for providing original content on SVODs is “to drive 
subscriptions.”7 Subscribers ideally seek out and value both content and the platform on 
which the content appears. Lotz remarks that these shows and the platforms on which 
they appear are specifically “distinguished by how audiences desire to experience it.”8 In 
order to better understand how Netflix and Hulu differentiate their product, in chapter 
one’s historical analysis and chapter three’s case studies, I build on Lotz’s exploration of 
how platforms seek to “distinguish” content, enhance audience experience, and 
differentiate themselves through branding strategies.  
While I will examine the programs made available to viewers, it is important to 
note that in the nonlinear context and through these new streaming platforms, power is 
not necessarily shifted to the viewer to the extent that their paratexts and that the 
surrounding discourses indicate.  Industries and other key stakeholders (advertisers, trade 
press, web designers, and more) continue to control what is presented to users in a variety 
of ways, including the design of their websites, the granular data they obtain about viewer 
consumption practices, and the content they have chosen to acquire and create in the first 
place. As Philip Napoli indicates, data results generated by algorithms (and by extension, 
                                                
7 Ibid., 110 
8 Ibid., 13. 
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their programmers) partially forecast and dictate industry decisions.9 Considering the 
commercial interests of the industry, as well as the data collection tools they employ, 
masked through website design and recommendation tools, I still find these businesses 
power the medium. Importantly, Lotz argues that “new technologies involve new rituals 
of use,” but she too does not claim these new rituals inherently involve power shifting to 
the viewers from the industry and its key stakeholders.10 Here I target Lotz’s argument 
directly toward SVOD services, while keeping in mind her emphasis on disproportionate 
power relations and streaming services’ growing reliance original content. In doing so, I 
focus on the link between “prized-content” and the conception of publicly defined 
success constructed by Netflix and Hulu. More specifically, I ask: How do these services 
convey to the public that they are providing value? What makes content “prized” for such 
services? How do the perceptions and definitions of “prized” deviate? I find that “prized-
content” is branded to audiences, which creates an industry-constructed discourse 
privileging SVODs, and speaks more broadly about the evolving state of contemporary 
television. 
Branding Television 
Television channels, corporations, and programs, after the 1980s, began branding 
themselves more actively. Branding, as a business strategy, continued into the post-
network era and becomes common practice for SVOD platforms. Branding history and 
                                                
 9 Philip Napoli, “On Automation in Media Industries: Integrating Algorithmic Media Production 
into Media Industries Scholarship,” Media Industries Journal 1, no. 1 (2014), 
http://www.mediaindustriesjournal.org/index.php/mij/article/view/14/60. 
10 Ibid., 263, 275. 
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theory also is a key component of my research. Analyzing how branding is used, for TV 
and SVOD platforms, helps to construct the audiences Netflix and Hulu target and, thus, 
how imagined audiences are created. Catherine Johnson’s book Branding Television 
gives an overview of the relationship between branding and television from a film and 
television studies perspective. Her case studies include both American and British 
television industries after the 1980s, serving as precedent to this study. Borrowing from 
Celia Lury’s understanding of branding as a “new media object” – a performative, 
interconnected object in a two-way relationship exchange between producers and 
consumers11 – Johnson considers branding as “a form of mediated and dynamic 
communication that constantly frames and reframes the relationships between producers, 
products, and consumers.”12 Johnson explains that, in the United States, branding (this 
mediated and dynamic communication) becomes necessary with the introduction of 
numerous cable channels, more choices in the post-network era, and, as I argue, SVOD’s 
efforts at differentiation. Strong brand identities enable services such as Hulu and Netflix 
to be “trusted places” for viewers. Brand identities sustain subscriber bases and 
viewership, enact and maintain relationships, and allow communication among content 
producers, products, and consumers.13 These relationships are my focus as I track 
mediated communication among these three parties through branding strategies employed 
by Netflix and Hulu. Netflix and Hulu’s brands act as a “trusted place” for viewers; both 
                                                
11 Celia Lury, “Just Do What? The Brand as New Media Object,” in Brands: The Logos of the 
Global Economy, (Routledge: New York and London, 2004) 5-6. 
12 Catherine Johnson, Branding Television (New York: Routledge, 2012), 4. 
13 Ibid., 46. 
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services, through their branding activities, communicate a guarantee of new, diverse 
content throughout the year.  
Media industries scholar John Caldwell adds to my theoretical framework on 
branding. Chapter six of his book Production Culture surveys an industrial perspective of 
branding in the mid-2000s.14 His analysis of how media industries brand themselves to 
cultivate difference and recognizable images via cultural performance is applicable to my 
study of SVOD services.15 Corporate identity, for Caldwell, is a performance of a unique 
brand, a means of mainstreaming difference for a company to promote their individual 
company and product. A brand identity influences intra-industry and extra-industrial 
dialogues surrounding all parts of a company, from managers to content.16 Netflix and 
Hulu’s brand identities are consistently alluded to in PR materials, corporate documents, 
and trade press interviews with each company. While Caldwell primarily draws from 
broadcast network and cable television’s brand strategies, he briefly mentions Napster’s 
model of branding interactivity and foregrounding participation to cultivate loyal users.17 
In the mid 2000s, television networks began modeling Napster in their own web spaces, 
creating websites that reflected each company’s desired brand identity. Netflix and Hulu 
continue this legacy through their interactive, branded online spaces.  
                                                
14 John Thornton Caldwell, Production Culture: Industrial Reflexivity and Critical Practice in 
Film and Television (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008).  
15 Ibid., 235-245.  
16 Ibid., 237. 
17 Ibid., 246. 
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Audience and Fan Studies: Imagined Viewership 
Audience studies is a wide-ranging academic field. Its methods are diverse, 
ranging from quantitative empirical studies to theories of active audiences and 
understanding audiences as actively decoding meaning from media texts. This thesis 
contains two frameworks that focus on theorizing the people that engage with media: 
industry-oriented audience studies and fan studies. Industry-oriented audience studies, 
including Ien Ang’s Desperately Seeking the Audience and Philip Napoli’s Audience 
Evolution: New Technologies and the Transformation of Media Audiences, provide an 
understanding of the difficulties in conceiving and studying “the television audience.”18 
These difficulties in studying the audience are faced, in different ways, by both industry 
practitioners and media studies scholars. Both Napoli and Ang consider the audience as a 
monetized entity constructed by industrial institutions, though Desperately Seeking the 
Audience calls for viewing audiences in different terms. As Ang argues, the “television 
audience” is not a definite category but rather an industry creation. This point is vital in 
understanding the conception of a subscriber base and imagined audience for Netflix and 
Hulu. Ang also demonstrates the importance of paratexts and, accordingly, the discourse 
analysis necessary to further understand how audiences are conceived.19 This is why an 
analysis of promotional paratexts and trade discourse is foundational to this study, as they 
demonstrate how audiences are created. Discourses surrounding the ratings of network 
television shows overwhelmingly categorize audiences into those who watch/don’t 
                                                
18 Ien Ang, Desperately Seeking the Audience (New York: Routledge, 1991); Philip M. Napoli, 
Audience Evolution: New Technologies and the Transformation of Media Audiences (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010). 
 19 Ang, Desperately Seeking, 8. 
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watch, and feature large, sweeping demographic data sets (18-34 year olds, male/female, 
etc.). In the post-network era – and especially in terms of streaming platforms – ratings 
discourse is much more speculative since SVODs do not regularly, publicly release 
ratings data. Thus, SVOD ratings and audiences are framed differently from linear 
outlets, which consider audiences largely through Nielsen ratings data.20 
Ang carefully makes a distinction between “television audience” as industrial 
discursive construct and the social world of actual audiences.21 The constructed audience 
is used by industries to control TV product, monetize the audience, and gain advertiser 
support. When Ang’s arguments are applied to SVOD platforms, which do not employ 
traditional Nielsen ratings to measure their audiences, her overall argument still remains 
true. While I avoid conceiving of audiences as “the one SVOD audience” constructed by 
Nielsen, however, I acknowledge that these services continue to measure a mass and 
otherwise construct their viewers in large groups from a top-down perspective. While 
audience is measured differently – through website interaction, subscriber numbers, and 
engagement – industries still tend to talk about the audience as measurable masses. This 
thesis will draw attention to Netflix and Hulu’s conceptions of “the audience” while also 
acknowledging the complexity and diversity of viewership, and granting that industry 
discourses perform self-serving commercial functions.  
In this project, I consider how key stakeholders, including the services 
themselves, as well as journalists and key business partners, conceive of SVODs’ 
                                                
 20 The Nielsen Company is considered the industry standard for television ratings.  
21 Ang, Desperately Seeking, 13. 
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imagined audience(s). Drawing from Napoli’s industry-based conception of the audience, 
I follow the latest ways that media industries, and in particular, the evolving television 
industry, researches audiences via active engagement, user-tracking systems, digital 
surveys, and other methods. While many of these results are not available to the public, I 
employ Napoli’s overarching argument: traditional ratings have become less relevant, in 
terms of media exposure, because of the wide range of content options for users.22 He 
calls for new, varied criteria in assessing content’s success (longer windows of 
measurement, social media engagement, finding ways to measure active watching 
behaviors). In so doing, he believes the ultimate result will be the “production of content 
that would not have been viable under traditional metrics of success.”23 Arguably, 
acquiring content that was not, in the long term, sustainable under traditional success 
metrics is already seen today, as SVOD platforms pick up new seasons of cancelled 
shows (The Mindy Project and Arrested Development, for example). Napoli’s 
understandings of new measurement practices and metrics for success will be applied to 
my analysis of choices made by streaming platforms in acquiring and distributing original 
content. In addition, I consider how these companies present their ratings both to others 
within the industry as well as to the wider public, and consider the cultural implications 
of such modes of presentation. 
Dallas Smythe’s theorization of audiences as commodities is helpful in 
conversation with Napoli and Ang’s industrial audience studies. Smythe argues that 
                                                
22 Napoli, Audience Evolution, 171. 
23 Ibid., 156. 
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audience power is the product of commercial mass media in monopoly capitalism and 
requires work. Thus, “Because audience power is produced, sold, purchased, and 
consumed, it commands a price and is a commodity.”24 Advertisers, through media 
institutions, buy the services of audiences, and in particular, predictable audience 
demographics.25 Commodifying the audience, specifically in relation to linear television, 
occurs when advertisers link their product to particular TV programs that are thought to 
attract certain demographics.26 The theorization of audience as commodity remains 
applicable when speaking of SVODs’ constructed audiences, which are in turn, 
commodified through advertisers (Hulu) and branding strategies. 
In addition to industry-oriented audience studies, fan studies scholarship must be 
foregrounded, as Netflix and Hulu frequently use the word “fans” in their paratexts. This 
will allow me to break down the ways scholars and industries use the word “fan,” what 
the word implies, and the viewing and engagement practices these varied definitions put 
forth. It also enables an analysis of how industries have co-opted marketing strategies that 
scholars have traditionally linked to fan productions. First, through this literature review, 
I examine how academics have theorized fans. Then, I note the scholarship that has 
linked fans and industries, through issues of co-optation, promotional fan labor, and gift 
economy. Through my case studies in chapter three and survey of audiences in chapter 
two, I apply this scholarship to when and how industries use the term. 
                                                
 24 Dallas W. Smythe, “On the Audience Commodity and its Work,” in Dependency Road: 
Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness, and Canada (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1981), 233. 
 25 Ibid., 234. 
 26 Ibid., 238. 
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 Generally, Netflix and Hulu use the term “fans” when describing particular 
desired types of audience engagement (using social media, binge-watching, etc.), 
furthering their ideal, imagined audience and their ways of measuring said audience. 
Traditionally, scholars classify fans as those who have a passionate/affective relationship 
with media, relating to a fan’s or fan community’s specific tastes. Early fan studies 
conducted in the early 1990s commonly defined and analyzed fans through participatory, 
active, production practices. In a historical overview of fan studies, Jonathan Gray, 
Cornel Sandvoss, and C. Lee Harrington classify this early stage as the “Fandom Is 
Beautiful” phase, as scholars place value on the fan (who had been Othered by 
mainstream society), attempting to “redeem [fans] as creative, thoughtful, and 
productive.”27 
 Henry Jenkins, one of the early fan scholars who sought to redeem fans, coined 
the foundational term “textual poaching.” Jenkins’ defined “textual poachers” as fans 
appropriating a text, taking and “poaching” it (usually through fan art or fan fiction) to 
serve the individual’s interests and participate in the text’s culture.28 When applying 
textual poaching to the digital realm, the term becomes increasingly visual, as common 
digital fannish creations include memes, gifs, gif sets, and fan art. Jenkins’ work emerges 
from Michel de Certeau and his idea of “making do.” Fan productions “re-use” a text in a 
way that adapts and operates to fit the fan’s personal needs, diverting from the industry-
                                                
 27 Jonathan Gray, Cornel Sandvoss, and C. Lee Harrington, “Introduction: Why Study Fans?” in 
Fandom: Identities and Communities in a Mediated World, ed. Jonathan Gray, Cornel Sandvoss, and C. 
Lee Harrington (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 3. 
 28 Henry Jenkins, Textual Poachers: Television Fans and Participatory Culture (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), 23. 
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constructed text, and “making do” through the text.29 Sometimes “making do” and 
poaching requires subverting a show’s official canon to serve the fan’s personal needs, on 
other occasions, the show’s canon is perpetuated and upheld through fan productions, 
with many productions blending subversion and perpetuation of the canon. In the digital 
era, commonly, social media websites like Tumblr, Facebook, and Twitter host, display, 
and privilege these fan images. On these websites, fans create, make, post, share, 
circulate, produce, elaborate, comment, and challenge (among many other actions) their 
own and others’ creations. SVOD services have adapted some of these visual creation 
tropes, as analyzed through case studies in chapter three. I argue this acknowledgement 
of fan practices is a direct appeal to fan engagement and participation, furthering the 
economic and marketing goals of Netflix and Hulu, generating buzz. 
Continuing Gray, Sandvoss, and Harrington’s historical analysis of fan studies, 
the second phase of fan studies expanded on research from the “Fandom is Beautiful” 
phase. The second phase, “Fan Cultures and Social Hierarchy,” “highlighted the 
replication of social and cultural hierarchies within fan- and subcultures,” with particular 
focus on the choice of fan objects and consumption practices.30 “Fandom and 
Modernity,” the third phase the authors present, occurs at a time when “being a fan has 
become an ever more common mode of cultural consumption.”31 As of the early 2000s, 
fan communities had migrated online, with numerous spaces for fans to gather, chat, and 
                                                
 29 Michel De Certeau, “’Making Do’: Uses and Tactics,” in The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. 
Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 30. 
 30 Gray, Sandvoss, and Harrington, “Introduction,” 6. 
 31 Ibid., 7. 
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share. Certain fan communities were more visible and mainstream, and fandom became 
“part of the fabric of our everyday lives.”32 Fandom became more visible to industries 
too, who in turn, see the value of fandom and fans as constructed audiences, and use 
some of these visible practices and tropes in their promotional practices.  
Other fan scholars, such as Bertha Chin, Mel Stanfill and Megan Condis, and 
Matthias Stork, link fans and industries differently. Their work discusses important issues 
of power surrounding industry’s direct co-optation of fan art, labor, and practices. In an 
introduction to a special issue of Transformative Works and Cultures on “Fandom and/as 
Labor,” Mel Stanfill and Megan Condis view fans through the lens of labor: fans do work 
and thus, generate value.33 Like Smythe’s theorization of audiences as commodities, an 
economic value is attached to fandom. Stanfill and Condis acknowledge scholars’ 
theorization of the industry’s recognition and encouragement of fans’ work as both 
pleasurable and exploitative. Work can be pleasurable to the individual creating the 
product, but considered exploitative when the industry uses it for commercial benefit. 
Furthering this divide, Matthias Stork’s article on the marketing practices of Glee (2009-
2015) and Bertha Chin’s article linking the fan sites Sherlockology and Galactia.tv to fan 
labor as gift giving both provide helpful case studies analyzing instances of industry-fan 
relationships.34 Stork surveys the ways in which Glee’s marketing approach directly 
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 33 Mel Stanfill and Megan Condis, “Fandom and/as Labor,” Transformative Works and Cultures, 
no. 15 (2014), http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/593/421. 
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Marketing Practice in Glee’s Transmedia Geography,” Transformative Works and Cultures, no. 15 (2014), 
http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/490/420; Bertha Chin, “Sherlockology 
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appeals to its core fans (Gleeks) and incites their direct participation through a 
multiplatform network of paratexts, creating a community and visible buzz around the 
show. Glee’s marketing team created fan contests (using fans’ contributions to promote 
the show) and circulated texts (preview videos, posters, cast interviews, etc.) on social 
media platforms. Glee’s cast and creators participated in Comic-Con panels and 
performance tours. Stork argues all of these processes together “created synergy between 
the official corporate and unofficial fan spaces,” sustaining discourse about Glee and 
exploiting fan contributions.35  
However, Bertha Chin theorizes that fan labor can also be considered as an act of 
gift giving, building social relationships and reputation within a fan community, and 
acquiring status.36 The assumption that fans are always inherently exploited by industries 
ignores fans’ personal conceptions and perhaps, gains achieved in their participations. 
Assuming exploitation does not fully acknowledge how fans conceptualize their work or 
their relationship to texts, communities, and industries. Chin calls for further studies and 
conversations with fans, surveying their relationships with industries and feelings about 
production and exploitation. The constraints of this project did not allow for a survey of 
fans and does not adequately gauge fans’ relationships with Netflix and Hulu. Still, I 
consider Chin’s argument and contend that SVOD marketers mold fan practices to further 
commercial goals, but this practice does not always directly correlate with the 
                                                                                                                                            
and Galactica.tv: Fan Sites as Gifts or Exploited Labor?” Transformative Works and Cultures, no. 15 
(2014), http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/513/416. 
 35 Stork, “The Cultural Economics.” 
 36 Chin, “Sherlockology.” 
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exploitation of fans. This relates back to SVOD’s definition of fans as being broader than 
scholars’ definitions of fans. Industries categorize fans as routine users who 
engage/promote on social media, regularly subscribe, watch a lot of programming, and/or 
spread the word about the platform. The SVOD industry’s “imagined audience” of fans is 
valued differently than fan scholars’ traditional construction and theorization of fans. 
Building on Mareike Jenner’s Scholarship 
Television scholar Mareike Jenner has published two articles addressing VOD 
platforms and their audiences that directly align with this project’s interest in the 
intersection of audiences, new distribution platforms, and original television series.37 
These articles serve as a foundation that I build upon, complicating Jenner’s perspective 
by digging into Netflix and Hulu’s original content libraries, detailing audience practices 
through promotional materials, and providing a framework for their various constructed 
audiences. In both pieces, Jenner argues that as Netflix has evolved to become a 
producer, distributor, and exhibitor, the company has positioned itself and its original 
content alongside “quality” and “cult” TV labels, and has embraced the viewing practices 
that are commonly associated with these types of texts. As Netflix began to finance 
content, Jenner argues, the company hired “television auteurs” like Jenji Kohan, or 
famous film actors like Kevin Spacey. And, by choosing to create a fourth season of 
“cult” (Jenner calls attention to the disputed nature of the term) television show Arrested 
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Development (2003-), Netflix chose to produce original content aligned with a perception 
of “cult” or “quality.” Jenner’s definitions of ‘cult’ and ‘quality,’ are ambiguously 
described as texts with complex narrative structures, culturally defined, and “encouraging 
and rewarding binge-watching through textual strategies.”38 
Important to my argument, Jenner chose to analyze shows deemed ‘quality’ or 
‘cult,’ like House of Cards or Arrested Development. Her 2014 and 2015 articles 
overlook the full range of available original material provided by these services and the 
broad range of audience tastes SVOD original content aims to satisfy. Both critics and 
scholars frequently write about shows they personally enjoy or that are discussed 
extensively within their taste cultures, building a canon that does not represent the entire 
catalog of texts produced and distributed. By doing so, they do not provide a detailed 
overview and understanding of these emerging platforms and the full range of business 
strategies employed by them. From their origins, Netflix and Hulu have produced shows 
that span a wide range of genres, taste categories, and demographics beyond the “quality” 
or “cult” designations including: kids’ shows [Turbo FAST (Netflix, 2013-)], horror 
series [Hemlock Grove (Netflix, 2013-2015)], stand-up comedy specials [Bill Burr: You 
People Are All the Same (Netflix, 2012)], parodies [The Hotwives (Hulu, 2014-)], and 
competition reality shows [If I Can Dream (Hulu, 2010)]. While remaining attentive to 
                                                
 38 Jenner, “Binge-Watching,” 2. 
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tendencies by television critics, journalists, and scholars to focus on quality content39 – I 
expand my analysis to all content types. 
In both articles, Jenner’s focus on binge watching behaviors connects to the idea 
that so-called “cult” or “quality” texts have a certain “bingeable” quality. Here Jenner 
draws from fan studies research to compare binging as “the viewing of an excessive 
amount of episodes” with fandom as an “excessive audience-text relationship.”40 She 
argues that any on-demand material inherently encourages fannish behavior in audiences. 
However, from her perspective, fannish behavior does not always equal binge watching. 
As seen in the section prior, what constitutes fans and fannish behavior is envisioned by 
industries and scholars in differing ways, and promoted in conflicting ways accordingly. I 
situate binge watching within a diverse range of audience and fan consumption practices. 
Certainly, through their marketing and PR materials, streaming platforms have 
encouraged extended/binge-viewing practices. They have done so, for example, by 
promoting scheduled marathons and auto-playing successive episodes. “Binge-watching” 
is a term regularly used and propagated by the popular press as well. However, as I build 
upon ideas provided in Ang’s work in Desperately Seeking the Audience, Jenner’s study 
limits her research to binge-watchers (or certain types of audiences or behaviors), which 
inherently categorizes populations that may not place limits on watching behaviors. 
While my study focuses on watching habits promoted by Netflix and Hulu as well as 
affiliated stakeholders (with binge watching predominately encouraged by Netflix, 
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weekly watching by Hulu), it is important to note that in practice, audiences’ watching 
habits are far more distinctive and diverse. I analyze how Netflix and Hulu imagine 
various types of audiences, especially, audiences as subscribers and as data. 
METHODS 
Discourse analysis as employed by media industries studies and audience studies 
will be used in order to investigate and understand publicly available industry documents, 
trade press coverage, and journalistic discourses surrounding the platforms and original 
series. My studies are accomplished through discourse analysis of trade press as modeled 
by John Caldwell. Acknowledging that trade press articles are primarily aimed toward 
industry personnel, Caldwell claims that the paratexts that the industry releases constructs 
an “aura” of the industrial “inner-space,” creating a narrative surrounding an industry that 
produces narratives.41 Knowing that PR materials and statements released to the trade 
press are shrouded in a self-promoting narrative of the company is important in 
grounding and situating this study. The biases and careful positioning expressed in their 
promotional materials and media coverage enables further analysis of how these 
businesses frame themselves. Working through these positions and noting their subjective 
tendencies and partial representations permits a valuable analysis of prioritization and the 
mechanics of situating a SVOD service within media industries. 
I have chosen Netflix and Hulu as case studies specifically because of their mass 
appeal and wide market reach, branding strategies, range of original content, and 
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continued coverage by the trade press. Both companies began their move into streaming 
by acquiring content and both started financing and licensing online original content in 
the early 2010s. However, my research window is 2007-2016 to more fully contextualize 
the original content within their wider subscription models and business practices. It is 
important to differentiate their business practices and the discourses about them. Hulu’s 
weekly release model, conglomerate funding sources, and partial reliance on 
advertisements mirrors legacy television network practices. In contrast, Netflix’s binge-
release model, tech company funding, and purely subscription-driven model represents a 
different way of circulating content and engaging with audiences. These variations create 
differences in how the two function within a larger media landscape. Business model 
disparities represent tensions between older, legacy, Hollywood, conglomerate-focused 
model and a newer, Silicon Valley, technology company-focused orientation.  
Primarily, my examples in this study will diverge from the commonly cited 
examples of House of Cards or Orange is the New Black (2013-) regularly referred to by 
the press and by other scholars. By digging further into Netflix and Hulu’s original 
content catalog and exploring shows like Battleground (2012), Wet Hot American 
Summer: First Day of Camp (2015), and The Mindy Project (Hulu’s season 4, 2015), I 
can look to shows that are not as “critically” acclaimed or as frequently quoted in trade 
publications. This is due, in part, to their relatively recent debuts and attempt to avoid 
building an academic subscription video-on-demand original content canon. Some of 
these critically acclaimed shows must be mentioned to build a robust depiction of Netflix 
and Hulu, but my main case studies will not focus on these shows. Alongside analysis of 
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the marketing and distribution of these original programs, I also survey and conduct 
textual analyses of advertisements and marketing materials, ranging from advertisements 
created for an audience of advertising professionals (Hulu) to advertisements promoting 
ideal watching habits (Netflix).  
Through a combination of textual analysis and the application of branding theory, 
case studies from Netflix and Hulu’s original programming and advertising materials 
enable more concrete analyses of industrial discourses and reception of programs by 
media critics, grounding my research more clearly in key examples. By comparing shows 
and ads from both platforms, I can better understand how each company imagines their 
audience and how these differing business decisions create specific cultural narratives 
about legacy companies, new technologies, the current state of television, the ongoing 
flux of media industries, and prized audience groups in the twenty-first century. I am 
interested in original television content specifically – rather than the larger slate of 
evergreen series, feature films, and specials provided by these services – because these 
programs are distributed exclusively on streaming platforms and thus mark a particularly 
distinct branding mechanism and value proposition for each. This original content most 




HISTORICAL CONTEXT: VIDEO-ON-DEMAND AND NETFLIX/HULU PRE-ORIGINAL 
CONTENT 
The larger landscape of VOD platforms from the late-2000s to mid-2010s 
includes an array of companies involved in acquiring previously aired content and 
licensing original content. Some of these platforms, such as arthouse-oriented Mubi and 
horror-oriented Shudder, cater more specifically to niche audiences; others, like Netflix 
and Amazon Prime, seek widespread “mass market” appeal by assembling a diverse 
subscriber base through the acquisition of varied content choices. Some platforms, like 
Netflix and Amazon Prime, require monthly or yearly subscription fees (subscription 
video-on-demand, or SVOD), while others, including (the now defunct) Yahoo Screen 
and the free and first-tier versions of Hulu, make money through online advertisements 
(advertising video-on-demand, or AVOD). Others, such as HBO Go and FX Now, are 
included with a cable package as part of a “TV Everywhere” value-added proposition.  
As noted above, this thesis will closely examine two of the larger, “wide-appeal” 
platforms which acquire a diverse set of content options and target larger audience 
numbers: First, Netflix, which makes its money through monthly subscriptions, and 
second, Hulu, which makes money from both advertisers and subscriptions. Netflix and 
Hulu’s “wide appeal” both in content and to different audiences will be valuable to my 
study. Such breadth in content and attempt to appeal to all audiences allows access to a 
wider range of material and variability in distribution and acquisition practices. Netflix 
and Hulu’s popularity and “wide appeal” also allows me to analyze the cultural impact of 
their presence in the industry. 
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To further contextualize video-on-demand platforms, the industrial and cultural 
conditions of television in the 2000s must be examined in this thesis. Contemporary 
television critics consistently write of “prestige television,” a “golden age of television,” 
“a platinum age,” or “peak television.”42 Select television content is discussed as 
“cinematic” or labeled as “quality” by industry personnel and tastemakers, while it is also 
described in quantitative terms as “excess” or “peak,” as labeled by FX President John 
Landgraf and taken up by the press, referring to a vast array and overabundance of 
choices. Netflix and Hulu have been contributing to the “peak” television era by licensing 
even more first-run original content; further, they are contributing to perceptions of 
“quality” by hiring well-known and well-respected actors, directors, and showrunners and 
actively pursuing awards. 
As streaming services have become a part of the evolving industry landscape, 
especially in the mid-2000s onward, and as television is culturally positioned using the 
above phrases, the technological factors contributing to the current state of television 
must be foregrounded. The expansion of high-speed Internet infrastructure across the 
United States in the early 2000s facilitated the growth and expansion of streaming 
services. In the same period, gadgets like laptops and tablets became more affordable and 
widespread, and mobile devices and mobile data plans enabled streaming capabilities for 
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a wider audience, varied distribution and consumption practices have developed. iFilm, 
the first online VOD platform, debuted in 1997.43 But, following its pervasive access, 
YouTube became a significant precedent for later SVODs. YouTube and other early 
video streaming sites like Dailymotion (both beginning in 2005) allowed users to gain 
familiarity with video streaming capabilities. Alongside YouTube’s success, 
complementary online content from broadcast networks ABC (the first network to offer 
catch-up TV episodes in 200644), NBC, CBS, and Fox served to enhance storytelling 
through network owned-and-operated websites featuring additional bonus video content, 
character profiles, recaps, chat rooms, and synopses.  
Through these technological, cultural, and industrial conditions, a few main, 
mass-appeal streaming video-on-demand platforms have emerged as of 2015. Among 
those dominating the market in VOD are Netflix, Amazon, Hulu, Yahoo, YouTube, and 
Apple.45 As noted above, a study of Netflix and Hulu, in particular, uncovers many other 
issues in the wider contemporary television and film industries, and points to these 
industries’ intersection with emerging digital video. Additionally, issues of policy, 
international viewership, distribution and acquisitions practices, production, and access, 
among many other topics, are vital to explore in future studies, in order to better 
understand the current media backdrop. Due to the limitations of this project, I cannot 
adequately address all of the above factors that influence the streaming industry. 
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Netflix and Hulu are only two companies among a growing number of streaming 
video services spending money on exclusive first-run original content. Another key 
competitor, Amazon Prime, has experienced critical acclaim with shows like Transparent 
(2014-) and Alpha House (2013-). Before ceasing operations after just two years, Yahoo 
Screen licensed the sixth season of Community (2009-2015, previously aired on NBC). 
Meanwhile, broadcast network and cable channels place more content online through 
their own websites or through video services like Hulu, and authenticated video-on-
demand service TV Everywhere as well as Dish’s over-the-top (OTT) service Sling TV 
both provide additional on-demand options for consumers. The “originals” labels used by 
Netflix and Hulu help each company construct a distinct brand, maintain popularity, 
minimize churn, and boost subscription numbers at a time when other players (Comcast, 
Dish, the networks, and more) enter and try to retain (or grow) market share. Before the 
spread of branding via original content (pre-2010s), Netflix and Hulu were discussed 
differently by the press and presented themselves differently to the public. As such, it is 
necessary to briefly provide an overview of their businesses before they launched VOD 
subscription options and original content licensing.  
From 1997-2006, Netflix was primarily known as a movie rental competitor.46 
The rental service sent DVDs to subscribers based on a rental queue determined by the 
user. Upon mailing back the DVD, Netflix in return sent the next film or TV season disc 
in a user’s queue. The service was akin to a lending library or Blockbuster, without late 
fees, and without driving to a nearby movie rental store. The company’s value 
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proposition during this phase related to its convenience. The shift to SVOD cloud-based 
content represented a significant set of changes, as the company shifted from physical to 
digital, and from providing subscribers with a few options at one time to many choices 
instantaneously. As of 2016, Netflix continues to send DVDs by mail but is not building 
more physical distribution warehouses47, and the dominant public discourse (perpetuated 
by Netflix and popular press) focuses on its streaming service and library. Subscribers 
can still access both physical and digital content, but the change in the culture’s 
understanding of the service – and how the service has sought to be understood by the 
culture – is significant. Netflix streaming continued to rely on providing subscribers with 
previously released films and TV shows from 2006 to the early 2010s. From 2005 to 
2008, Netflix’s Red Envelope Entertainment foray represented an early interest in 
original film production and distribution. This move also foreshadowed the company’s 
eventual focus on original content.  
In contrast, in 2007, Hulu started with digital distribution, instead of relying on 
the distribution of physical media. In other words, the platform did not undergo the 
extreme physical to digital transition. The company has remained more focused on 
growth and adding subscription tiers rather than in altering its content delivery method. 
Hulu was built to remain competitive as a response to media companies’ anxieties 
surrounding YouTube and digital streaming. Hulu has always been tied to digital, but its 
response and competition has changed as industries anxieties shift from the possibilities 
                                                




of YouTube to Netflix’s sizeable original programming lineup. From 2007-2010, Hulu 
was an advertising-driven company, branded as a complement to traditional television, 
and a response to DVR and on-demand options from cable companies. While Hulu 
presently continues to function in these ways, its content has diversified with original 
programs, adding and extending more network licensing deals, renewing its 2011 
licensing deal with the Criterion Collection48, and its subscription options encourage 
different ways of engaging with and understanding the website and its product. Hulu has 
moved from complement to television to, partially and hesitantly – in part due to its 
corporate owners’ legacy investments – a surrogate for television.  
In the following chapters, first I analyze Netflix and Hulu, their stakeholders, 
subscription offerings, and original content origins. This analysis is contextualized within 
the television and media industry as I consider Netflix and Hulu’s competition and wider 
cultural discourse disseminated by trade press and critics. Chapter one serves to situate 
Netflix and Hulu within an industrial and cultural framework, and argues how its 
stakeholders and business models influence the platforms. In chapter two, I move to 
consider audiences, specifically, how Netflix and Hulu imagine, construct, directly 
address, and measure audiences; how their key stakeholders inform this construction; and 
the wider cultural narratives that result from these discourses. I find that Netflix and Hulu 
focus on audience engagement and promote particular types of viewing behaviors, while 
constructing audiences as data and as subscribers. Chapter three builds on the analysis 
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from chapters one and two. I conduct case studies from specific advertisements, social 
media campaigns, and public narratives to demonstrate particular examples of 
stakeholder influence, audience construction, and cultural discourses. Branding theory is 
applied to Netflix and Hulu’s brand within the SVOD market, and fan studies scholarship 
is used to track how these platforms co-opt rhetoric and practices traditionally assigned to 
fans. These chapters are interwoven with larger claims about the television industry, 
cultural discourses about television and media, ongoing competition between Hollywood 
legacy companies and Silicon Valley technology companies, and underlying anxieties 




Complement or Competition? How Netflix and Hulu’s Stakeholders 
Shape Cultural Understandings of the Platforms 
 
In her foundational book, Hollywood and Broadcasting, Michele Hilmes argues 
that advertisers directly influenced radio shows (and consequently television broadcast). 
Through her extensive case studies, she finds that stakeholders – including sponsors, 
networks, studios, and advertisers – defined and informed broadcasting models, content, 
and production culture that emerged from the 1920s through the 1980s. This fundamental 
structure of broadcasting, “entertainment…used as bait for commercial messages,” has 
continued to change.1 First, cable largely drew from broadcasting structures – advertising, 
rerun content, televisual flow, etc. – in the 1980s. Then, in the twenty-first century, 
different business entities became involved in a constantly evolving media industry, 
entities that define and inform streaming models and content. 
Hilmes’ argument, influenced by Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding model, with 
particular focus on the process of encoding, finds that broadcasting developed in part due 
to advertising agency goals. These encoders distinctly shaped the production of radio 
broadcasts. Recognizably, relationships between stakeholders have continually shifted in 
the near-century since broadcasting’s inception. In this first chapter, I examine the 
relationship between stakeholders as they took shape in the twenty-first century and as 
they are connected to Netflix and Hulu’s business and programming practices. Netflix 
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and Hulu’s original content functions as bait: to hook subscribers and satisfy 
stakeholders. 
Like the 1930s radio shows Hilmes explores, Lux Radio Theatre and RKO 
Theater of the Air, Netflix and Hulu remain under the influence of certain prominent 
industry stakeholders. Lux Radio Theatre was encoded by major advertising agencies, 
influencing the creative practices of the programs’ production and the ways radio was 
broadcast.  Netflix and Hulu’s encoders – shareholders and conglomerate owners, 
respectively – influence how the platforms function and how each platform first 
approached original content. For these two platforms, who those stakeholders are – and 
the kinds of pressures they place upon Netflix and Hulu – differ dramatically. As noted in 
the last chapter, both companies initially distributed previously aired televisual content 
before slowly growing and translating broadcast and cable’s TV practices (actors, 
directors, format, structure, seasonality, seriality, etc.) into their own originally licensed, 
exclusive content. However, how both companies have diverged from and adapted to 
what Hilmes deems “the fundamental economic structures of broadcasting”2 differs.  
The ways that Netflix and Hulu each deviate from and copy the economic 
structures of broadcasting – and subsequently, cable as well – provide the focal point for 
this chapter.  Here my analysis involves assessing what each of the companies seeks to 
achieve, while also considering the key players that inform platform structures and goals. 
To examine their business goals and how they construct particular images of themselves 
via public discourse, first, I detail the origins of both companies as streaming subscription 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
 34 
services. I follow up this overview with a comparative analysis of the stakeholders each 
company engages most prominently with, and a discussion of how this engagement with 
stakeholders connects to their respective business models. After laying out their business 
models and illustrating their relations with key stakeholders (owners, partners, directors, 
etc.), I then move on to look at their original series ventures as well as how each 
constructs their main competition in their corporate materials and through remarks from 
key executives. I conclude by addressing how the trade press articles and TV critics write 
about each, prioritizing certain practices, and positioning the two in specific ways. This 
chapter ties together how the business models and stakeholders of both Netflix and Hulu 
have informed their growth, which in turn connects to larger cultural discourses about 
technology companies and legacy media corporations. This analysis goes further than 
historicizing the two companies or providing partial narratives; this chapter also places 
the platforms in a larger context, puts them in conversation with business narratives, and 









BUILDING OUT SUBSCRIPTION OPTIONS: HULU PLUS AND NETFLIX STREAMING 
 
2007 • Joint venture announced with NBCUniversal Television Group/Comcast and 
News Corp/Fox Broadcasting company 
• Online beta testing begins in October 
• Jason Kilar named CEO 
• Andy Forsell named SVP, head of content and distribution 
2008 • Website launches publicly 
2009 • Disney-ABC Television Group joins (NBCUniversal 32%, Fox 36%, Disney-
ABC 32%) 
2010 • Hulu Plus subscription option debuts 
2012 • First original scripted program, Battleground, premieres; plans for seven other 
original programs to premiere over the next several years 
2013 • Mike Hopkins named CEO, replacing Kilar 
2014 • Library expands with huge Seinfeld and South Park deals 
• Craig Erwich named SVP, head of content, replacing Forsell 
• Tim Connolly named SVP, head of distribution 
2015 • Ad-free Hulu subscription option debuts 
Table 1: Hulu’s Timeline and Key Players 
Prior to 2010, Hulu was not a subscription platform but rather solely advertising 
supported. Post-2010, a Hulu subscription became optional, though necessary if 
customers sought out older TV episodes, seasons, or deeper catalog items. After 
Hulu.com debuted to the public in 2008, their next big product announcement, Hulu Plus, 
was publicized in June 2010 on Hulu’s official blog, with a post written by CEO Jason 
Kilar.3 Hulu’s official blog directs posts toward a general audience, but includes details 
for journalists to spread through stories and reports, expanding its reach. Kilar called 
Hulu Plus an “incremental” and “complement” product for current Hulu users, for the 
price of $7.99 per month. The subscription was still ad-supported, but, instead of offering 
                                                




a “handful of trailing episodes,” Hulu Plus offered full seasons of current shows, as well 
as access to back seasons.  
With Hulu Plus’s premiere, the company also introduced the option to watch 
programs from other types of screens beyond computer screens. In other words, Hulu 
Plus subscribers were not limited to Mac or PC browser windows, but rather could access 
the service on new screen options including internet-connected smart TVs, Blu-ray 
players, tablets, and smart phones. Kilar called the service both “revolutionary” and 
“convenient,” speaking directly to Hulu users and to new subscribers. He proclaimed that 
the service was built to answer the question, “What if your favorite TV shows loved you 
back?”4  
Presumably, Hulu Plus “loved” its subscribers by offering more programming and 
ease of access on multiple screens. Here we see Kilar anthropomorphizing Hulu’s 
television shows and attaching an affective relationship between the new platform and its 
viewers. Hulu Plus subscribers, from this main question Kilar poses, “get more” from 
watching television with the complement of Hulu Plus. Apart from appeasing existing 
users, to summarize, Hulu Plus differentiated itself – and potentially attracted new users – 
by providing more content, both old and new, with a monthly subscription fee. The 
service continued to rely partially on advertisements interspersed between segments, as 
with traditional linear television programming.  
Most of Kilar’s blog announcement was geared toward hooking new subscribers. 
However, the last two paragraphs mention a particular goal of Hulu’s: to please its three 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
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customer groups, “our end users, our advertisers, and our content suppliers.” While the 
order of these groups and the amount of time spent on the blog post talking about “end 
users” may indicate that Hulu prioritized these stakeholders, Kilar is clearly trying to 
equally appease all groups in positioning this new subscription tier:  
With Hulu Plus, we believe we’ve met that goal [pleasing the three customer 
groups]. For our end users, we’re offering them the most convenient way to 
access their favorite shows, on devices they love, in high definition, at a fair price. 
For our advertisers, who allow us to keep our Hulu Plus price low with the 
support of ad revenue, we offer one of the world’s most effective advertising 
platforms, with the ability to speak effectively to users across a variety of devices, 
anywhere they happen to be. And finally, for our content partners [such as The 
Walt Disney Company, Fox, and The CW], we offer revenues that compensate 
them fairly for bearing the cost of producing the shows we love.5 
  
This explicit acknowledgement of three customer groups marks a crucial 
difference between Hulu and Netflix. Hulu presents its platform here as similar to 
broadcast and cable television, using content to draw in advertisers and viewers. This is 
largely due to its media conglomerate owners, Disney (ABC), Comcast (NBC), and 21st 
Century Fox. Hollywood content companies directly influence Hulu. As has always been 
the case with linear television, effective advertising generates profit. Presumably, Hulu’s 
Hollywood owners stressed the benefits of the advertising model. Additionally, money 
from subscribers allows Hulu to bring in more content; much has been true with cable for 
decades with its dual revenue model. This traditional conception of a new technology 
makes sense considering Hulu’s partners and stakeholders, which are examined in greater 
detail in the next section. 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
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1997 • Start-up (DVD distribution service) founded by Reed Hastings (CEO) and 
Marc Randolph (co-founder, CEO) 
1999 • DVD-by-mail subscription service begins 
2000 • Ted Sarandos named Chief Content Officer 
2002 • Public IPO 
2005 • Red Envelope Entertainment launches, begins to acquire films such as The 
Puffy Chair (2005), 2 Days in Paris (2007), and Sherrybaby (2006) 
2006 • First generation of VOD service debuts 
2007 • Video-on-demand subscription popularity grows within the company 
2008 • Red Envelope Entertainment shuts down to avoid competing with film studios 
2010 • Netflix’s website becomes biggest source of U.S. internet traffic6 
• Enters Canadian market, begins international venture 
2011 • Enters Latin American market (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico) 
• Enters Caribbean market 
2012 • Enters European market (UK and Ireland) 
• Original program Lilyhammer debuts (in partnership with NRK/Norway) 
2013 • Original television programs House of Cards, Hemlock Grove, Orange is the 
New Black, Turbo FAST debut 
2014 • Original documentary The Square nominated for an Academy Award 
• Robin Wright and Kevin Spacey (original television show House of Cards) 
nominated for Golden Globes 
2015 • Enters Australia/New Zealand market 
• Enters Japanese market 
2016 • Hastings labels Netflix a “global TV network”7 
• Netflix available in 190 countries 
• Enters South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan 
Table 2: Netflix Timeline and Key Players 
As noted in the previous chapter, Netflix began as an online DVD rental 
subscription service in 1997. Created by entrepreneur Reed Hastings and 
software/computer engineer Marc Randolph, the company emphasized an intuitive user 
                                                
 6 “Global Internet Phenomenon Report: Spring 2011,” Sandvine, May 12, 2011, 
https://www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-phenomena/2011/1h-2011-global-internet-
phenomena-report.pdf. 




interface and personalized algorithms for its DVD catalog. Whereas Hulu’s interface, 
market orientation, and mode of audience engagement were a product of Hollywood 
content companies, Netflix’s were the product of the technology industry. In 2007, 
Netflix introduced a collection of 1,000 acquired films and television shows to stream 
online – including Zoolander (2001), Kojak (1973-1978), and The Motorcycle Diaries 
(2004)8 – enabling the company to bypass the U.S. Postal Service. As Netflix’s streaming 
service and content library continued to grow, like Hulu, their compatible technology 
expanded to allow access from smartphones, tablets, and Internet connected TVs. In the 
early 2010s, Netflix began to compete more directly with linear television channels by 
introducing original streaming television series, documentaries, and stand-up comedy 
specials.9  
Beginning as early as fourth quarter (Q4) 2006, Netflix’s letters to shareholders 
included references to their rapidly expanding Internet streaming services. To understand 
Netflix’s move to streaming video content, I have tracked Reed Hastings’s quotes in 
quarterly reports from 2006-2010, with a focus on his discussion of online video growth. 
For example, in Q4 2006, Hastings wrote: “Our accomplishments during the year – 
strong subscriber growth, continued improvement in the customer experience, and 
increased profitability – together with the recent launch of the first generation of our 
online video option, leave us better positioned than ever to achieve our long-term 
                                                
 8 Miguel Helft, “Netflix to Deliver Movies to the PC,” The New York Times, January 16, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/16/technology/16netflix.html. 
9 “Company Overview,” Netflix, accessed May 15, 2015, 
https://pr.netflix.com/WebClient/loginPageSalesNetWorksAction.do?contentGroupId=10477. 
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objective of being the movie rental leader.”10 In Q3 2007, Hastings assures shareholders 
that “we will remain focused on making our core service even better and growing our 
DVD rental business, while continuing to invest in our Internet delivery initiatives.”11 
Finally, in Q4 2007, Hastings attributes success to both DVD rentals and “TV episodes 
over the Internet instantly, [which] positions us to achieve solid growth in 2008 and over 
the long term.”12  
In 2008, Netflix began announcing partnerships with hardware over-the-top 
(OTT) services like Roku. In Q4 2010, the company announced their strong interest in 
television and itemized the steps taken to expand television content. Netflix started with 
particular content company deals, ABC/Disney for example, licensing full seasons of 
syndicated content, while touting that the company remained commercial free.13 In a 
paragraph on DVDs in the Q4 2010 report, Hastings assured shareholders that “streaming 
is much bigger for us than DVD, in hours of entertainment delivered, and streaming is 
growing much faster than DVD.”14  
As such examples indicate, over time, Netflix emphasized expansion of its 
streaming service. Through these quarterly reports, we can see how Hastings informs the 
                                                
10 Deborah Crawford, “Netflix Announces Q4 2006 Financial Results,” January 24, 2007, 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NFLX/4046490554x0x69407/18397325-97AD-4EAE-B193-
DC2C28B68312/4Q06%20Earnings%20Release%201%2024%2007%20final.pdf. 
11 Deborah Crawford, “Netflix Announces Q3 2007 Financial Results,” October 22, 2007, 
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D9101907AB66/nflx1022.pdf. 
12 Deborah Crawford, “Netflix Announces Q4 2007 Financial Results,” January 23, 2008, 
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company’s shareholders and the press that the focus of the company was shifting from 
DVD rentals to providing full seasons of television content, and more specifically, 
content available exclusively through Netflix. By conducting this background on the 
early years of Hulu Plus and Netflix streaming services, we can see how Netflix, from its 
inception, was linked to the technology industry and Hulu was linked to legacy media 
companies. Hulu’s public materials were directed toward three groups: end users, 
advertisers, and content suppliers. Netflix official materials target shareholders. These 
differences speak to the ways each company is owned and operated (Hulu privately and 
Netflix publicly). In the next section I shift to focus more specifically on how Netflix’s 
business partners and Hulu’s corporate owners and influence both businesses. 
OWNERSHIP/PARTNERSHIP: NETFLIX VS. HULU 
During its beta testing period, Hulu revealed its distribution partner sites in 
September 2007: AOL, Comcast, MSN, MySpace, and Yahoo.15 Linked to these 
technology websites, and distributing Hulu’s content on AOL or Yahoo, Hulu began to 
sound more like a technology start-up, networking with social media services, Internet 
service providers, and video streaming services.16 Relationships with these tech 
companies are connected to Hulu’s stated goal of streaming television online in a 
community setting. However, the fact that its corporate owner-investors were Comcast’s 
                                                
15 Jason Kilar, “A Hulu Hello,” Hulu, September 4, 2007, http://blog.hulu.com/2007/09/04/a-hulu-
hello/. 
 16 “Hulu Debuts via Private Beta and on Distribution Partners AOL, Comcast, MSN, Myspace, 




NBCUniversal, 21st Century Fox, and Disney indicate much deeper roots and allegiances 
to an old, legacy American broadcast television model.  
A major difference between Hulu and Netflix rests in their ownership. Hulu is a 
privately owned company, co-owned by the three media conglomerates mentioned above. 
Netflix began as a technology start-up and remains a publicly traded company. While 
Hulu must answer to the three governing bodies of Comcast’s NBCU, 21st Century Fox, 
and Disney, Netflix must be more transparent and appease its shareholders through its 
publicly released quarterly reports. The variations in ownership are reflected their 
distinctive business models. Hulu has retained many markers of linear television, 
including: advertisements interrupting content, maintenance of televisual flow17, 
foregrounding of network channel logos on the lower third of the screen, offering the 
ability for viewers to search for programs by television channels, and providing access to 
terrestrial TV episodes (and Hulu Originals) following their weekly broadcast. Netflix, on 
the other hand, does not directly answer to media conglomerates – it merely licenses 
content from them – and is not trying to serve as a complement cable or broadcast 
television. At times, Netflix plays nice with broadcast and cable television channels (e.g., 
by acquiring their content for a reasonable price) while at other times, it directly 
competes with broadcast and cable television channels (e.g., by licensing their own 
original programs, often directly from companies providing content to cable and 
broadcast outlets was well).  
                                                
 17 Raymond Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form (New York: Routledge, 2003), 
86-96. 
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These clear distinctions, with Hulu serving the interests of established television 
companies and Netflix frequently subverting legacy companies’ traditions, have become 
blurrier and more nuanced as both businesses have continued to grow. With the 
introduction of Hulu’s original programs in 2012 and a monthly subscription plan without 
advertisements in 2015, Hulu became a more direct competitor to Netflix as well as 
Amazon. It has still tried to acquire current and past television content, but increasingly 
distinguished itself as being both a complement to broadcast/cable television (like a 
DVR) and an exclusive provider of desirable content (like Netflix or HBO).  
It remains uncertain whether Hulu will succeed in both roles. The company has 
many stakeholders to answer to, including: advertisers, its media conglomerate-parents, 
additional content providers, and subscribers. Ideally, television series exclusively 
distributed through Hulu (Casual, The Path, Difficult People, 11.22.63, and more) will 
boost its advertising sales and increase its subscriptions, making Hulu’s three 
conglomerate owners happy. As of 2015, Hulu was in talks with Time Warner about 
joining Hulu as a fourth owner. Variety predicted if Time Warner became a fourth owner, 
Hulu would have more money to compete with Netflix.18 And, because of Time Warner’s 
large investment in cable subscriptions, Time Warner executives have spoken against 
Hulu’s practice of making current season TV content available online, threatening linear 
television viewership.19 If Time Warner bought a quarter of Hulu, Hulu’s streaming 
                                                
 18 Todd Spangler, “Hulu Looking to Sell Stake to Time Warner: Report,” Variety, November 12, 
2015, http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/hulu-time-warner-stake-1201639424/. 
 19 Keach Hagey and Shalini Ramachandran, “Time Warner Talks With Hulu Zero In on Current 
Seasons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/time-warner-talks-with-
hulu-zero-in-on-current-seasons-1454276633. 
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window may increase. However, this deal has not happened, but it reveals Hulu’s 
uncertain future and desire to compete and grow: to catch up with Netflix. 
 Though Hulu’s new original content may make it more competitive with Netflix 
and other SVODs (and linear channels as well), linear TV networks have begun to debut 
their own Hulu-like websites  (Lifetime’s MyLifetime or FX’s FXNOW) that stream new 
episodes, either with advertisements or requiring login (“authentication”) for cable 
subscribers. Perhaps Hulu foresaw broadcast and cable networks creating their own 
proprietary websites, and countered with original programs. Though their internal 
business decisions remain unknown, as of 2016, Hulu straddles an interesting space 
between new streaming technologies (subscription-based, original programs) and legacy 
media companies (conglomerate corporate ownership, linear programs, advertising). I 
explore the origins of original series in the next section, in an effort to further understand 
the goals of Hulu and Netflix. 
ORIGINAL SERIES ORIGINS: FROM EXPERIMENTATION TO EXPANSION 
Both Netflix and Hulu began investing in the production and distribution of 
television shows in the early 2010s. Original series are especially noteworthy because 
these TV products are distinguishing factors for services, enabling differentiation among 
SVOD services as well as between them and broadcast/cable television offerings. 
Original programs help both Netflix and Hulu compete directly with the television 
industry, brand their product to subscribers, and gain recognition among both the trade 
and popular press as well as with critics. 
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In summer 2011, Hulu began publicly plugging its exclusive programming. 
Exclusive programming, for Hulu, is first-run programming distributed in Hulu’s market. 
For example, the U.K. TV drama Misfits (2009-2013) debuts in the U.S. as a Hulu 
exclusive. In Jason Kilar’s Q3 2011 blog post, he announced that Hulu’s three summer 
exclusives (Misfits, an hour long U.K. drama, The Booth at the End, a half-hour Canadian 
drama, and Whites, a BBC sitcom) all, at some point in the season, hit number one on 
Hulu’s Most Popular ranking. Because of this success, Kilar reasoned, “We will continue 
to invest in bringing our users exclusive, defining, top-tier programming.”20 The same 
2011 blog post included a synopsis of the results of Hulu’s “first foray into original long-
form programming,” documentary series A Day in the Life, directed by documentary 
filmmaker Morgan Spurlock. Kilar touted A Day in the Life as an example of the 
“exclusive, high-quality content” Hulu looked to invest in. Presumably, such content 
would continue to have recognizable talent attached. By summer 2012, Hulu had doubled 
its Hulu Exclusive and Hulu Original Series offerings. Hulu Exclusives have run in other 
markets, whereas Hulu Originals debut solely on Hulu. At this time in 2012, the 
streaming platform announced ten varied exclusive and original series, “including 
comedy, sci-fi, travel, reality, and even a little magic.”21 The original series revealed 
included Spoilers (a 10 episode, half-hour, movie talk show with Kevin Smith) and Up to 
Speed (a six episode, hour long travel series created by Richard Linklater). In Kilar’s 
2012 year-end wrap up, he announced that “We are extremely proud of the TV series we 
                                                
20 Jason Kilar, “Q3,” Hulu, October 5, 2011, http://blog.hulu.com/2011/10/05/q3/. 
21 Andy Forssell, “Summertime...and the Viewing Is Easy,” Hulu, May 20, 2012, 
http://blog.hulu.com/2012/05/20/summertime…and-the-viewing-is-easy/. 
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released in 2012, and are excited about the slate of original series and exclusive series 
coming to Hulu in 2013.”22 After the debut of the aforementioned nonfiction original 
shows, and scripted exclusive shows, Hulu began offering a few original programs each 
subsequent year, with its first scripted original program, Battleground, airing in 2012. 
Battleground (2012-) is a half-hour workplace/political mockumentary. On 
Hulu’s official, titular blog, a post from February 2012 highlights an interview with 
Battleground’s creator, JD Walsh (actor, Dharma and Greg, Two and a Half Men, turned 
writer-producer). 23 The post asks Walsh, “Why Hulu?” In other words, Hulu wants to 
foreground why Hulu was a better choice over linear TV or other VODs. Walsh’s 
explanation uses key words and phrases commonly employed by Netflix, Hulu, and 
premium cable outlets (HBO, FX, and more) original content creators. He declares he 
“connected with the people [at Hulu]” and he was given “tremendous freedom” which is 
“rare in [the television] industry.”24 This publicized “freedom for creators” at Hulu 
frames their company as eager, easy to work with, and providing an opportunity for 
creators to innovate in an unrestricted atmosphere. Walsh says Hulu “trust[ed] its creators 
to make the show that they believe in” which is why he chose the company. Their notes 
“were always an attempt – not to satisfy a demographic or a fad or a meme – but instead 
the notes were to make the show smarter or funnier or more interesting with its 
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storytelling.”25 By framing Hulu as interested in the quality of a show, not in pandering to 
a certain audience, Walsh directly contrasts Hulu to networks or cable companies 
interested in satisfying a particular niche demographic. This appeal to a particular 
demographic is common for cable television, and the overconfident language about Hulu 
speaks more toward advertising Hulu as a generous space for creators. Battleground was 
Hulu’s first scripted original series, its marketing materials needed to cultivate a friendly 
narrative to persuade future content creators and partners to link up with Hulu. 
Simultaneously, the 2011-2014 Netflix quarterly reports written for the 
company’s investors, and frequently taken up by press outlets for news stories, construct 
a narrative of Netflix Originals’ beginnings and convey some of the reasons behind the 
creation of the originals department. As noted above, Lilyhammer (2012-2014), “a fish-
out-of-water story set in Norway” starring Steven Van Zandt, was the first Netflix 
Original Series; the first season debuted in February 2012.26 While these reports do not 
reveal the amount spent on licensing Lilyhammer, House of Cards first season, or the 
fourth season of Arrested Development, the document states that if the shows are, 
“popular enough on Netflix so that the fees we’ve paid for each are in-line with that of 
other equally-popular content on Netflix during the same time period, we’ll consider 
them a success.”27 As we see here, Netflix was defining its own standards of success, and 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 Reed Hastings and David Wells, “Investor Letter Q4 2011,” January 25, 2012, 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/NFLX/170689058x0x536469/7D1A24B7-C8CC-4F19-A1DD-
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27 Ibid., 8 
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that success is not determined by Nielsen audience ratings. Netflix measures success 
internally, based on engagement with other programs.  
These early originals test cases must have exceeded Netflix’s standards of success 
because the company has continued to acquire projects and label them as “Netflix 
Originals.” Indeed, it has done so increasingly frequently as each year has proceeded 
(Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Number of New Netflix Original Series, Films, and Specials Premiered from 
2012-2016 
Though, importantly, legacy companies have tightened control on their content, 
increasing the price of licensed material or pulling their content from the streaming 
service. Famously, in 2011, Starz cut their four-year Netflix deal short after (allegedly) 
Netflix’s popularity surged and too many subscribers streamed the films, exceeding the 
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maximum agreed upon content views.28 Following Starz pulling its content, analysts 
speculated if Starz were to renegotiate and renew with Netflix, Netflix’s renewal cost 
would increase significantly.29 As legacy companies realized Netflix’s potential and 
popularity, they asked for more money per content deal. The Netflix Originals expansion 
displayed both a desire to legitimate its business and a counter to a more competitive 
content licensing market. However, publicly at least, in the first quarter of 2011, Netflix’s 
report explained the rationale for the acquisition of House of Cards from Media Rights 
Capital (a film and television studio): “Rather than a shift in strategy towards original 
programming, our decision was driven by a desire to test a new licensing model using a 
small portion of our content budget.”30 As this statement indicates, early on, Netflix did 
not define itself as being in the “originals” business. Their reluctance to define 
themselves in this manner is possibly due to the format of investor letters. Indications of a 
big change in Netflix’s strategy could signal an unstable investment period. They must 
“gain confidence,” licensing a few shows to test the market, before they publicize their 
new strategy extensively.  
Over time, Netflix executives did reveal greater confidence in and enthusiasm for 
their original programs. As early as 2012, the “Original Programming” section became a 
major theme in their reports, and moved up in the document from the seventh page to the 
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third. The letters to shareholders in 2012 and 2013 read much differently than the ones 
from 2011. Previously the “originals” section comprised about half a page in the middle 
of the document. As of 2012, the company consciously divided itself into three phases; 
with the first involved in acquiring movies, the second focused on licensing prior-season 
television, and in 2012, a shift in focus to functioning as a service with the “first window 
premiere of exclusive serialized episodic television.”31 Rather than turning to original 
programming as “a strategic experiment,” as was the case early on, as of 2012, original 
programming is a priority for Netflix’s “strategic expansion.”32  
In Q1 2012, the investor letter speaks optimistically about their new strategy, 
reassuring investors who may have been concerned about this shift in orientation: 
“Another way to think of originals is vertical integration; can we remove enough 
inefficiency from the show launch process that we can acquire content more cheaply 
through licensing shows directly rather than going through distributors who have already 
launched a show?”33 Conceptualizing Netflix Originals as a practice of vertical 
integration, Netflix effectively removed the intermediaries of distributors (namely, the 
media conglomerates such as Disney, Comcast-Universal, and 21st Century Fox), saving 
the technology company time (waiting for an entire season to air on TV) and money. 
Though the company has not cut all ties with these conglomerates, Netflix has worked 
                                                
31 Reed Hastings and David Wells, “Investor Letter Q3 2012,” October 23, 2012, 
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with large media conglomerates as financiers, most famously, Disney-owned Marvel 
Television.34 
By 2013-2014, Netflix continued to announce new original content. They 
continued diversifying their originals selections with a children’s show like Turbo: 
F.A.S.T. (DreamWorks Animation Television), sci-fi thriller Sense8 (2015-, Motion 
Picture Capital), prison dramedy Orange is the New Black (Lionsgate Television), Ricky 
Gervais’ comedy Derek (2012-2014, Derek Productions), animated series BoJack 
Horseman (2014-, Tornante Company), a final season of The Killing (2011-2014), 
historical drama Marco Polo (2014-), and crime thriller Narcos (2015-, Gaumont 
International Television), among others.3536 In a chapter from Distribution Revolution, a 
book consisting of a series of interviews with media industry executives and creatives, 
Netflix’s chief content officer Ted Sarandos shares his perception of Netflix’s model of 
acquisition and original programming choices. For Sarandos, Netflix got into the business 
of original programming to gain greater control, to provide programs that “matter most to 
our consumers,” and to become competitive with broadcast and cable networks reluctant 
to sell their past seasons (e.g., HBO, Showtime, and Starz).37  
                                                
 34 Todd Spangler, “Netflix Orders Four Marvel Live-Action Series,” Variety, November 7, 2013, 
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Underscoring a key distinction in mission between Netflix and Hulu, Sarandos 
notes that “Algorithms drive our entire website – there isn’t an inch of uncalculated 
space.”38 Using algorithms and monitoring user trends, Sarandos then predicts “what we 
should and shouldn’t have on the site,” which applies to original content and content 
from networks as well.39 Netflix identified a set of users dedicated to watching hour-long, 
serialized, television dramas, so Sarandos acquired House of Cards.40 Sarandos claims to 
vet Netflix Originals projects more thoroughly than network and cable channel do. 
Networks traditionally have a pilot season of multiple shows, after which some shows are 
cancelled, and the remaining run for a few episodes to a season before cancellation or 
renewal. Instead, Sarandos commits to fewer shows that are “better developed” with “a 
couple of scripts, talent attached, a bible” then rewarding the commitment with nothing 
“short of a full-season commitment,” sometimes two-season commitments, a practice 
associated with cable television.41 This development process allows Netflix to skip the 
pilot season method of narrowing down shows based on preview test screenings, critics’ 
reactions, and viewer response. Sarandos promotes how the company chooses forward-
looking tactics; potentially saving money on shows that flop, and using more granular 
viewer data first before committing, rather than committing then cutting based on viewer 
data. This is Netflix’s distinctive and competitive advantage, the amount of granular 
viewer data deployed to commit to projects. 
                                                
38 Ibid., 144. 
39 Ibid., 136, 141. 
40 Ibid., 141. 
41 Ibid., 142. 
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In this context – and with this data – Netflix holds the power over linear networks 
and cable channels. Comparatively, linear television outlets are still relying on Nielsen 
audience data, which overwhelms public discourse and serves as currency in television 
industries. What’s more, that data is made widely available to journalists, competitors, 
and the public, whereas Netflix’s information is not available to any outside parties. 
Nielsen data does not include ranking systems (favorites or stars) like Netflix allows. As 
Netflix expands internationally, they are amassing an ever-growing amount of viewer 
data. They are aware of taste profiles and viewer behavior patterns by region, gender, and 
age – and even more precise data (star rankings, genre preferences, local and global 
viewing habits, etc.) than such demographic categories than those. As Netflix expands 
further, the content they acquire for their Originals label is important to examine in 
greater detail, as it reveals more about the kinds of audiences Netflix wishes to privilege. 
The types of audiences Netflix privileges are addressed in chapter two. 
COMPETITORS: NETFLIX AND HULU “POURING FUEL ON THE FIRE” 
“The secular shift to on-demand consumption is best described as ‘consumers 
evolving vs. old habits’ rather than ‘Netflix vs. traditional media.’ We’re all racing to 
fulfill consumer desires.” 
-Netflix Q3 Report, 201542 
 
As illustrated in the sections above, although both fall under the umbrella term 
“subscription video-on-demand,” Netflix and Hulu define themselves as very different 
entities in terms of their business models and stated goals in acquiring original content. 
                                                




They also imagine their competitors differently, even when they are cited as each other’s 
competitors. In April 2015, Variety writers Debra Birnbaum and Todd Spangler situated 
Hulu against “VOD rivals” Netflix and Amazon Prime original series, stating that, 
comparatively, “Hulu gained little traction with more modest efforts.”43 While 
spokespeople from Hulu did not directly refer to Netflix or Amazon Prime, Hulu CEO 
Mike Hopkins underscored his company’s objective of combining originals, syndication, 
and marketing for ultimate success in the competitive SVOD environment. Speaking to 
Hulu’s competitive outlook, their large upcoming content slate, and the vast amount of 
content available on various platforms in an era of “peak TV,” Hopkins said: “If you’re in 
it, you have to win it… We’re trying to pour fuel on the fire.”44 
Potential competitors for Hulu not only include other SVOD services but also 
television channels such as Lifetime, TBS, or HBO that form standalone websites or apps 
for viewers to access whether through authentication, advertising, or some combination 
thereof. Even their own corporate owners have such sites (e.g., ABC’s WATCH ABC, 
NBC’s integrated into the NBC.com homepage, and Fox’s FOX NOW). In an interview 
with The Hollywood Reporter, Hopkins responded to this growing threat by saying that, 
while these websites are new and fresh, Hulu is “right there along with a lot of other 
folks. In many ways, we’re out ahead of a lot of people in respect to our distribution 
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footprint.”45 Hopkins flaunts Hulu’s longevity and breadth of programming, while 
striving to remain in the good graces of television networks. Hopkins, at Business 
Insider’s IGNITION December 2015 conference, reinforced the idea that Hulu is more 
“network-friendly” than Netflix, because it allows networks to keep their brand logos on 
the content. As such, the service represents a better place for networks to sell content than 
Netflix.46  
Despite such claims, in October 2015 Reed Hastings infamously argued that Hulu 
is “much more disruptive” than Netflix and is a “even more of a cord-cutter’s dream than 
Netflix is.”47 These brief quotes reflect Hastings’s view that Netflix is a better place for 
networks to sell content because there more time elapses between the original on-air 
debut of a show and Netflix’s season acquisition. The time delay functions similarly to a 
DVD box set release. Regardless of which platform is more “network friendly” or 
“disruptive,” Hulu and Netflix are compared and pitted against each other. Such moves 
suggest the perception that most individuals are unlikely to subscribe to multiple services, 
though subscriber overlap exists, and thus they are seeking money from many of the 
same individuals.  
The competitive discourse around Netflix and Hulu represents a larger 
conversation occurring in the television industry. With these new services and 
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technology, the industry does not know who will dominate, how consumers choose one 
subscription over another, what content will be popular, and how the future of television 
will play out. Anxiety over predicting the future is a recurring theme in the industry; 
Netflix and Hulu are participating in traditional discourses of the television industry and 
television studies.  To show Netflix’s participation in this competitive discourse, in 2013, 
Ted Sarandos said that Netflix’s central goal was “to become HBO faster than HBO can 
become us.”48 This brief statement reveals the extent to which Sarandos considered HBO 
a threat to the streaming service, or, at least publicly, wanted to establish a connection 
between Netflix and HBO. HBO has been extensively theorized in academia and in the 
popular press as a key proponent of “quality” television.49 As such, it is logical for Netflix 
to align itself with HBO, or to position the service to compete with/beat HBO’s offerings. 
To distinguish itself and “become HBO faster,” Netflix, multiple times per year, has 
released extensive schedules for future television and film offerings and repeatedly vied 
against HBO for Emmys and Golden Globes.  
Although Sarandos deployed such a comparison between Netflix and HBO for a 
few years, as of April 2015, Netflix did not present itself as in competition with HBO or 
Internet MVPD offerings (e.g., Sony’s Playstation Vue and Dish’s Sling TV). At least in 
its own internal reports and statements, Netflix does not believe its content is a substitute 
for HBO, especially because of the differences in their content libraries (HBO does not 
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sell its original shows to Netflix).50 With regard to Internet MVPD offerings, Netflix 
identifies competition between MVPDs and pay TV bundles – but does not see itself as 
subject to these competitive forces directly. In letters to shareholders, as of 2015, Netflix 
does not publicly consider itself in competition with anything, besides the long-term 
threat of piracy, which they determine happens, “mostly outside the US.”51 Considering 
the audience for these quarterly reports, Netflix can be seen as assuring their shareholders 
that their product is unique, untouchable, thriving, and worth investing in. 
The Netflix Q3 2015 report lists the evolution of other SVOD services, including 
Hulu’s commercial-free option, HBO GO, and Amazon Prime. The statement continues: 
“The[se companies] remain active bidders for content, in addition to all the cable 
networks around the world.”52 Instead of threats to the company, in 2015, Netflix frames 
other media players as trying to play catch up with what it is doing. A quote from 
Sarandos in Q4 2015 is especially impactful and effectively represents Netflix’s 
confident attitude regarding the issue of competition with established TV networks: 
The growth of Netflix has created some anxiety among TV networks and calls to 
be fearful. Or, at the other extreme, an NBC executive recently said Internet TV is 
overblown and that linear TV is “TV like God intended.” Our investors are not as 
sure of God’s intentions for TV, and instead think that Internet TV is a 
fundamentally better entertainment experience that will gain share for many 
years.53 
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Further evidence of Netflix’s vision for its original series – as well as its attitude 
toward its competition – resides in a page on their Investor Relations website 
(ir.netflix.com) titled “Long-Term View.” This page is dedicated to “Netflix’s View: 
Internet TV is replacing linear TV.”54 Relying on archiving from Wayback Machine, the 
“long-term view” webpage has focused on Internet TV replacing linear TV since May 
2013.55 Netflix lists what they perceive as precedents, such as linear TV replacing radio 
entertainment, and the telephone replacing the telegraph, prompting a competitive 
response from linear television as Netflix presumes its future: SVODs replacing linear 
television. Speaking to their primary audience of future/current investors, their focus as 
of January 2016 has been on first-class apps in delivering Internet TV, “content people 
love” through curating titles and having “the best in each category” based on consumer 
feedback, possessing a “focused passion brand, not a do-everything brand,” 
straightforwardness, and flexibility. This forward-thinking document is meant to forecast 
media consumption in a general sense, construct itself as competing against linear 
television, and to place Netflix as ahead of the curve. Netflix strives here to show 
investors their willingness to change and reinforce how they are responding, reacting to, 
and predicting trends in an evolving media environment.  
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TRADE PRESS AND CRITICS RESPOND 
After examining the rhetoric directly produced and circulated by both businesses 
to investors and the press, it is worth looking at trade publications like Variety and 
Deadline, as well as magazines and newspapers like The New York Times, and consider 
how they in turn tell the story of Netflix and Hulu’s development. The rhetoric from trade 
press and critics surrounding Netflix and Hulu has changed over time, due in part to the 
companies’ business decisions, content acquisition choices, rising popularity, shifting 
subscriber bases, and evolving relationships with other companies. The ways the press 
and critics have responded is also a function of changes in the larger media landscape and 
the place of these companies within the broader television and media ecosystem. As 
mentioned in an earlier section on competitors, trade press writers are eager to 
compare/contrast platforms with TV channels and their stories work to situate Netflix and 
Hulu in the television industry.  
To begin an overview of the shifts in trade coverage over time, as an example of 
how the press engaged with Netflix and Hulu originals early on, we can look to a 2012 
article from Mike Hale of The New York Times. Here, Hale directly compares the first 
original shows from Netflix and Hulu, Lilyhammer and Battlefield.56 Compared to the 
abundant coverage on Netflix and Hulu original shows in the later 2010s, these show did 
not receive a lot of media attention. Hale asks readers to think back to the early days of 
cable. He lists examples, HBO in the late 1970s and early 1980s and AMC in the early 
                                                




2000s. These channels used the money they earned from acquiring previously aired 
shows to fund their original content ventures. Hale compared Hulu and Netflix with HBO 
and AMC, and considered the quality/pleasurability of the cable channels’ early shows. 
Hale argues that television networks and SVOD platforms must build original content 
libraries. He maintains that it takes time and effort to achieve a culturally acclaimed show 
like The Sopranos (1999-2007) or Mad Men (2007-2015). While the article is mainly a 
review of Battlefield (the show he deemed more enjoyable of the two due to its shorter 
length and engaging story), Hale foresaw a future for both Hulu and Netflix by 
comparing both platforms to HBO and AMC: “It’s worth remembering, though, that as 
disposable as ‘Battleground’ or ‘Lilyhammer’ may be, they match up pretty well with, 
say, ‘Dream On’ and ‘Remember WENN’ – shows that those with long memories may 
recall from the early days of HBO and AMC. There’s always room for improvement.”57 
While Hale consciously chose to focus on Hulu’s first original series over Netflix’s, over 
time, Netflix’s original program lineup built more rapidly and gained more critical 
acclaim than Hulu’s, as is evident in the discussion of trade press articles provided below. 
Hale’s optimism for both companies is noteworthy in hindsight, but he does not hide his 
feelings of disappointment toward their first televisual attempts. 
In 2015, Netflix announced they would not renew Lilyhammer for a fourth season, 
citing an “entangled ownership and rights web and escalating costs” as the reasons for 
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cancellation.58 Previous articles focused primarily on upcoming shows, considered how 
SVODs were disrupting the larger media environment, and speculated on the future of 
both linear and nonlinear television, by 2015, articles increased the topics addressed 
regarding Netflix’s cancellations59, disappointments60, global expansion efforts61, award 
show nominations62, and more. Indiewire marked the change in rhetoric in July 2015, 
with an article titled “Netflix and the Future: The Two Things Changing Your Favorite 
Streaming Platform.” The article ends by stating: “…through smart investment and 
innovative strategizing, Netflix has become one of the most powerful players in the game 
in a very short window of time.”63 The article’s author, Liz Shannon Miller, drew a 
distinct contrast between Netflix’s original content offerings in 2013 and 2015, noting a 
move from “a lineup dominated by prestige dramas” to “everything from stand-up 
specials to documentaries to the multi-camera sitcom.” The two words that Netflix – and 
Ted Sarandos, in particular – consistently used circa 2015 were “exclusivity and control,” 
thereby reinforcing the service’s goals for original television programming expansion and 
slowing down licensing deals with legacy companies. Trade press writers covering 
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Netflix mirror these words64, indicating how these writers copy the rhetoric circulated by 
Netflix and Hulu and pointing to a relationship between corporate discourse and media 
coverage.  
At the same moment that Netflix was called “Your Favorite Streaming Platform” 
in Indiewire, critics reviewed Hulu’s latest original series. At this point in 2015, from the 
perspective of most trade press coverage, Netflix is deemed as more established than 
Hulu and is more respected by the press for its accomplishments. In July 2015, Variety 
reviewed Hulu’s new television show, Difficult People (2015-), produced by Amy 
Poehler, and starring Julie Klausner and Billy Eichner. Critic Bryan Lowry argues that 
Difficult People will change how Hulu original programs are perceived: “Hulu has made 
only modest noise with original programming, a situation that could change, and should, 
with Difficult People.”65 Indeed, this review  (among several others66) marks a distinct 
2015-2016 slate of original shows. These series often feature recognizable talent, 
including Casual (2015-, produced by Jason Reitman), The Mindy Project season four 
(with established talent Mindy Kaling and special guests), 11.22.63 (2016, based on a 
Stephen King novel, executive produced by J.J. Abrams, and starring James Franco), and 
The Path (2016-, starring Aaron Paul). While the success of these shows is yet to be 
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determined – and success itself becomes more difficult to measure in the streaming 
context, in which audiences are measured differently – such linkages via original 
programming represent another example of how the two companies are played off of one 
another by the press.  
Another common way Hulu is talked about and related back to Netflix is the 
company’s decision to stick to weekly releases for its original series.67 This becomes 
important in August 2015 as the aforementioned shows are about to debut on Hulu, and 
Netflix’s establishment of the “binge-viewing” model has increasingly become a cultural 
norm. A Variety article explaining Hulu’s reasoning for maintaining the weekly release 
model cites Netflix as a trailblazer with the binge-viewing model, and Amazon following 
suit.68 However, Hulu differentiates its brand and platform model by maintaining the 
weekly release model, explaining that this practice “value[s] the shared experience and 
the joy of the water cooler that is television,” as Craig Erwich, Hulu’s senior VP and head 
of content explained.69 However, although the premieres are weekly, audiences have the 
option to binge watch and catch up after Hulu has debuted a certain number of episodes 
or the entire season. This business decision of relying on weekly premieres, then, 
becomes a way to distinguish Hulu, and play with the format, while sticking to a more 
“traditional” way (at least upon premiere) of viewing television…commercials included. 
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It also points to Hulu’s heritage: its status as a joint venture of legacy media 
conglomerates. 
CONCLUSION 
As illustrated through an examination of their corporate documents, Netflix and 
Hulu’s different business models and stakeholders influence the two companies’ 
activities. Furthermore, how both companies position their businesses in the broader 
media market, and how critics and the trade press cover both companies, in turn influence 
our understandings of them. Netflix, without ownership ties to media conglomerates, has 
been able to move into original series territory more thoroughly and quickly than Hulu. 
Hulu has sustained its relationships with advertisers, obliging broadcast and cable 
television networks, while also changing their business model in recent years. Hulu has 
struggled to navigate the competing demands of being an innovative streaming service 
taking on competitors such as Netflix and Amazon even as it serves the interests of 
companies bound to a linear television model. The fact that both companies began 
distributing original programs points to the competitive nature of the television industry, 
and “peak” TV’s variety of choice. Chapter two will look at another important factor in 
these two businesses: how Netflix and Hulu consider and construct their audiences. The 
subscriber/SVOD relationship reveals interesting behavior patterns emerging in both 
companies, showing how each prioritizes viewership and engagement, and acquires 




“Something for Everybody”: Imagining Netflix and Hulu’s Audiences 
In her research on postwar television and the sociocultural and industrial context 
of its production, Lynn Spigel finds that daytime schedules, program types, and 
promotional materials were “based upon ideal images of female viewers and, 
consequently, they were rooted in abstract conceptions about women’s lives.”1 Spigel 
presents the idea that the industry formed ideal and abstract conceptions of daytime 
television’s female audiences. As such, she argues that scholars cannot reconstitute these 
women’s viewing experiences. Rather, she maintains, “we can better understand [female 
daytime audience’s] concerns and practices by examining the ways in which their 
viewing experiences were explained to them at the time.”2 Women’s magazines, among 
other media forms, featured images, articles, and promotional materials that worked 
alongside the television industry’s own materials to promote and construct certain modes 
of spectatorship. Similar methods, I argue, can be employed to understand how 
contemporary streaming media services such as Netflix and Hulu have promoted their 
brands and modeled ways of engaging with and understanding these platforms.  
In this second chapter, I study forms of media similar to those Spigel describes: 
industry materials such as advertisements, press releases, blog posts, one sheets, and trade 
as well as mainstream media forms. This study is meant to represent a portion of 
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industrially authored and directed materials. I acknowledge there are many other forms of 
mediated content that construct and imagine viewers, which must be considered in the 
future. Due to the breadth of content available in the post-network era, catered to fit many 
different niches, as a result, niche content targets and constructs many different types of 
viewers. The portion of this content I examine – industry-authored texts available on 
platform-affiliated websites and trade press, by proxy – helps us to see how SVODs such 
as Netflix and Hulu constructed viewers and encouraged particular relationships between 
their services and their audiences. As Spigel notes, this is an abstract concept of people; 
neither she nor I intend or expect to reconstruct the “actual” audience. Ien Ang has made 
clear such a task would be impossible, as discussed below. However, materials about 
Netflix and Hulu’s audience base as ideal abstractions can further help explain how they 
imagine people and envision their platform and its programming being used.  
 This imagined audience is important to examine because it reveals a particular 
form of corporate audience engagement. In Desperately Seeking the Audience, Ang finds 
two ways the television industry (as of 1991) saw audiences: audience-as-market 
(connected to commercial service) and audience-as-public (connected to public service).3 
“Giving the audience what it wants” defines the former construction, audience-as-market, 
and the latter, by “a pervasive sense of cultural responsibility and social accountability.”4 
Legacy television companies and premium cable channels, in particular, have imagined 
audiences in additional ways since Ang’s 1991 theorization – how SVODs construct 
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audiences overlaps with particular ways legacy TV considers audiences. I target three 
ways, in particular, Netflix and Hulu imagine audiences: audiences as data, as 
subscribers, and as promotional partners. Netflix and Hulu’s engagement with these three 
audience imaginings contributes to an understanding of their business plans, their brands, 
and their ideal viewing practices. Further, it addresses culturally shifting ideas of 
audiences and the ever-changing television industry. Both SVODs spend valuable 
resources, time, and money trying to understand their audience and reach subscribers. 
Imagined audiences inform how shows are marketed, and how both companies explain 
their goals to the public. These audiences can be commodified and used by SVODs and 
stakeholders, as theorized by Smythe. New media technologies are built on a platform of 
both greater consumer choice and personalization. However, an analysis of how Netflix 
and Hulu imagine and construct audiences via marketing materials and public discourse 
show the limits to the construct of “consumer choice” and process of commodification. In 
addition, this analysis reveals both the planning that goes into the creation of content 
choices, and sheds light on how companies strive to gain and sustain viewership. 
 Previous studies of streaming television and new media platforms have focused 
on audiences interacting with VOD television through the lenses of big data, 
surveillance/dataveillance, and producer/consumer power relationships.5 For example, 
studies from media scholar Mark Andrejevic have propagated the idea that audiences and 
their labor are exploited by industry. This study, due to the constraints of this project, 
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only explores how these platforms consider audiences. Nevertheless, this study will not 
speak in broad strokes about the absolute power of industries because audiences watch 
and interact in diverse ways even within the constructions that the industry places upon 
them. The approach taken here, which draws from cultural studies in its orientation, is 
necessary to add to the growing body of literature on streaming television. At the same 
time, I still acknowledge that the TV industry – and for the purposes of my study, SVOD 
services such as Netflix and Hulu – constructs audiences.  
 The process of constructing, gaining, and sustaining audiences is often framed, by 
industries, through “engagement.” Ivan Askwith tracks the use of the word “engagement” 
in industrial discourse in the early 2000s. Askwith, through the industry discourse, argues 
that television executives saw the future success of television as reliant on “recasting it as 
an active medium,” largely accomplished through “audience engagement.”6 Engagement, 
for Askwith and the industry discourses he cites, is loosely defined as “a level of 
attentiveness and emotional investment,” though he admits there is no one, consistent 
definition.7 To supplement this flexible definition, he tracks the patterns within discourse 
and helpfully breaks down the industry’s understanding of and rhetoric surrounding the 
process of engagement: 
1) The viewer decides to watch a television program. 
2) The viewer is “engaged” with the content of the program. 
3) The viewer will accordingly do one or more of the following: 
 a. Watch the entire program without changing channels. 
  b. Become a regular and loyal viewer of the program. 
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  c. Be a more attentive viewer when watching the program. 
4) As an added bonus, the viewer may also: 
  a. Become passionate about the program. 
  b. Convince others to watch the program as well. 
5) All of the possible results listed in (3) and (4), in turn, benefit the program’s 
advertisers, since each of these outcomes increase the odds of the viewer being 
exposed to, aware of, and persuaded by the advertisement. 
6) Furthermore, through a process of transference, the viewer’s positive feelings 
toward the program will “spill over,” making the viewer more receptive to 
advertising appearing during the program.8 
 
This above process and the terms employed change only slightly with SVOD 
technologies. I have slightly revised Askwith’s break down. 
1) The viewer decides to visit a SVOD platform. 
2) The viewer decides to watch a television program. 
3) The viewer is “engaged” with the content of the program. 
4) The viewer will accordingly do one or more of the following: 
 a. Watch the entire program without exiting the platform. 
 b. Become a regular, loyal, or binge-viewer of the program. 
 c. Be a more attentive viewer when watching the program. 
5) As an added bonus, the viewer may also: 
 a. Become passionate about the program. 
 b. Convince others to watch the program as well (through social media  
  posts or word of mouth) 
5) All of the possible results listed in (4) and (5), in turn, benefit the program’s 
advertisers (or the platform’s shareholders), since each of these outcomes 
increase the odds of the viewer being exposed to, aware of, and persuaded by the 
advertisement. Or increase the odds of the viewer being persuaded by the 
enjoyment and variety of programming. 
6) Furthermore, through a process of transference, the viewer’s positive feelings 
toward the program will “spill over,” making the viewer more receptive to 
advertising appearing during the program. Or, through the process of 
transference, the viewer’s positive feelings toward the program will “spill over,” 
making the viewer more receptive to continuing their monthly SVOD subscription. 
 
At its core, this audience engagement process (as detailed by Askwith, through industry 
discourse) remains true as SVOD stakeholders talk about engaging an audience. 
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Engagement measurement strategies, similarly continuing within SVOD industry 
discourse, are most broadly broken down in three ways: through viewer attitudes, viewer 
behaviors, and viewer attentiveness.9 Primary documents in this chapter and chapter three 
will point to these patterns of “engagement,” as framed through Netflix and Hulu 
discourse. 
In this chapter, I am interested specifically in Netflix and Hulu in order to focus 
on the streaming sector of the television industry’s conception/imagination of the 
audience. This speaks more broadly for culturally circulated, changing ideas about 
audiences, namely, valuing engagement and quantifying viewership through big data. 
These questions, in turn, build on the questions explored in chapter one, which included 
addressing how these companies decided on what products to acquire and how to position 
that product to consumers it wished to acquire and retain.  
AUDIENCES/VIEWERS/USERS/FANS/SUBSCRIBERS 
Before analyzing how Netflix and Hulu construct audience through 
advertisements, public discourses, and industry materials, I want to break down some 
commonly used industry terms of the “people watching SVOD television”: viewers, 
subscribers, audiences, users, spectators, fans, and more. Throughout the analysis in the 
following chapters, it is important to keep in mind how Netflix and Hulu use these terms, 
when they use them, and for what purposes. Frequently, the platforms use these terms in 
ways different than how scholars have traditionally defined them. The terms are conflated 
and used informally. This section differentiates between the scholarly definitions and the 
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industrial definitions of the most common terms used. However, for my purposes, 
evoking Ien Ang, I primarily use “audiences” to describe Netflix and Hulu’s imagined 
groups of people watching and interacting with their platform and shows. I use “viewers” 
or “viewership” to describe a mass of people and their behaviors when the group has not 
been constructed by industries. For scholars, audiences are (in part) inherently defined by 
media organizations.10 This definition is true for industries too, as we see the construction 
of audiences by media organizations throughout this chapter. While audience(s) are 
inherently plural, “viewer” or “viewers” can span from singular to mass. The term 
television “viewers,” as a mass, does not evoke the same definition as “audiences” – 
“viewers” lacks the connotation of a constructed group. Industries use “viewer” to 
indicate a specific (if fictional) person, and they swap between “audiences” and 
“viewers” most frequently. 
 For media scholars, especially those who study the Internet, “users” are 
“generally referred to as active internet contributors.”11 However, when deployed by 
industries and trade press, a Netflix or Hulu “user” is simply a person who logs in and/or 
interacts with the website. “Fan” has similar links to “user,” in that the word evokes 
active behavior. Traditionally, though, scholars narrow the definition of fan to include 
people who have a passionate/affective relationship with a media text(s). Also, for 
scholars, the definition can suggest participation and production practices. More broadly, 
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industries imagine fans as dedicated, engaged consumers of content and use the term 
accordingly, which will be explored further in chapter three. 
A subscriber represents the outlier of the group; the word evokes both a monetary 
exchange and a long-term relationship with a service. There is a gatekeeping system in 
play, a login and password is necessary in order to receive access. This is apparent with 
Netflix; one needs to be a subscriber (or know a subscriber12) to access their service. 
Netflix cultivates subscribers – that is the main goal of their business model. Hulu, as we 
saw throughout chapter one, relies only partially on subscribers due to its three different 
tiers of service. Hulu Plus relies on subscribers to generate revenue. Subscribers’ 
interaction can stop at a monthly monetary exchange. The monthly fee is automatically 
taken out of one’s credit/debit card or bank account. Just because one pays to subscribe 
does not mean they watch the service. Being a subscriber does not equate to being a 
viewer, audience, user, and/or fan. Netflix does not need view counts (like broadcast and 
cable television) to function; it just needs monthly payments. Traditional, free Hulu does 
need viewer counts and viewer engagement to appease and gain advertising partners, but 
the commercial-free Hulu Plus tier requires monthly payments.  
The goal for both of these companies is how to build and sustain subscribers, 
though the degree to which it matters differs for Netflix versus Hulu. This is how 
original, diverse content comes into play. Both Netflix and Hulu Plus (since full seasons 
                                                
 12 There is a considerable informal economy of SVOD password sharing. Famously, 2015 Emmys 
host, comedian Andy Samberg, shared his HBO Now username and password during the live broadcast. 
The login information worked briefly, until HBO suspended the account. Brad Tuttle, “The Real Rules for 
Sharing Passwords at HBO Now, Netflix, Amazon Prime, and Hulu,” Time, September 21, 2015, 
http://time.com/money/4043147/hbo-netflix-amazon-prime-share-account-password/. 
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of original programs can only be accessed through Hulu’s subscription tiers) have created 
a business of maintaining and growing subscriber bases, and see the most benefit in 
creating their own original content. This marks a rhetoric shift in television industries.  
 When working to maintain and grow subscription numbers, both Netflix and Hulu 
Plus speak in terms of audiences, fans, and viewers. In an industrial context, all of these 
terms evoke the practice of watching content. However, for industries, the distinction 
between subscribers and audiences, viewers, fans, and/or users is most significant. For 
public relations purposes, talking publicly in terms of audiences, users, fans, and viewers 
is more beneficial to Netflix and Hulu than talking in terms of subscribers. These terms 
obfuscate thoughts of monetary exchanges and customer relationships, shifting the 
rhetoric to a simple exchange of content for eyeballs (as is also true with broadcast or 
cable television). When Netflix and Hulu deploy the term “fans” in industry and public 
relations materials, the word imagines a particular audience and encourages interaction 
with the platform – through excessive watching, participation with official social media 
feeds, rating programs, and regular usage – rather than just speaking in monetary terms. 
Following this breakdown of subscribers versus audiences, users, etc. the 
foundations of monetary exchanges between people and Netflix/Hulu are important to 
keep in mind. But, more broadly, the fact that audiences are labeled and conflated in 
various ways points toward larger cultural patterns. Audiences are differently addressed 
and catered to, revealing SVOD (and wider television industry) uncertainty about their 
audience and anxieties over maintaining popularity. 
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IMAGINING AUDIENCES: AUDIENCES AS DATA 
 
It’s intuition that is checked by data. 
- Ted Sarandos13 
 Netflix famously attributed the critical (and presumed numerical) success of 
House of Cards season one to their data collection system. Trade and popular press, and 
academics, can only presume numerical success because the company’s rhetoric implies 
large viewing numbers but does not release specifics. 
[Netflix] already knew that a healthy share had streamed the work of Mr. Fincher, 
the director of “The Social Network,” from beginning to end. And films featuring 
Mr. Spacey had always done well, as had the British version of “House of Cards.” 
With those three circles of interest, Netflix was able to find a Venn diagram 
intersection that suggested that buying the series would be a very good bet on 
original programming.14  
 
As media studies scholar Chuck Tryon writes in his essay “Building on a House of 
Cards,” Netflix consciously attempted to build an “on-demand spectator” through the 
analysis of viewer engagement and taste.15 Tryon puts it simply: “through its use of 
algorithmic recommendations, Netflix seems to promise us that it knows what we want to 
watch before even we do.”16  While the practice of imagining and predicting content that 
                                                
13 Alan Sepinwall, “Ted Talk: State of the Netflix Union Discussion with Chief Content Officer 
Ted Sarandos,” Hitfix, January 26, 2016, http://www.hitfix.com/whats-alan-watching/ted-talk-state-of-the-
netflix-union-discussion-with-chief-content-officer-ted-sarandos. 
14 David Carr, “Giving Viewers What They Want,” The New York Times, February 24, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/business/media/for-house-of-cards-using-big-data-to-guarantee-its-
popularity.html?_r=0. 
15 Chuck Tryon, “Building on a House of Cards: On-Demand Culture and Big Data,” Media 




audiences want is a widespread practice in linear television, Netflix’s novelty (for the 
company and for journalistic press) lies in the type of data Netflix acquires and how they 
acquire it. Due to behind-the-scenes data driving the website, and thus, programming 
choices (especially regarding Netflix originals), it is critical to include a discussion of 
how Netflix promotes particular audience behaviors in order to construct their imagined 
audience. This pursuit of knowledge might be perceived as a feedback loop: Audiences 
watch, rate, and interact with television shows on Netflix, Netflix gathers this data17 and 
creates shows. But also, Netflix purposefully promotes certain content as the first thing 
audiences see upon visiting the website, influencing audiences to watch, rate, and interact 
with them in turn. The programs, Netflix’s infrastructure, and its subscribers all inform 
each other. We must understand all three, but especially for this study, it is important to 
note Netflix’s role as a player in this feedback loop.  
When Netflix spins this process of gathering big data to the public, the rhetoric 
used in interviews and articles is one of “giving back” to a loyal audience. The company 
heavily promotes the idea that it provides the audience with a range of choices. I agree 
with Tryon’s counter to such claims; he maintains that Netflix’s algorithmic system in 
fact constrains and limits consumer choices, effectively feeding consumers particular 
programs based on the strict categories recommended to users through their personalized 
algorithmic data set. Although Netflix’s conception of their audience is limited to these 
                                                
17 Yvonne Villarreal, “When Did You Get Hooked On ‘Mad Men’? And When Did Netflix Know 
It?,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-
et-ct-netflix-hooked-episodes-tv-shows-20150922-htmlstory.html. A pertinent example of the type of data 
they collect is seen when Netflix announced they knew when viewers were “hooked” on a show. Netflix 
presumably collects data based on time, sustained watching behavior, star ratings, etc. 
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data sets, users can still play within the boundaries it constructs. Setting up this feedback 
loop and the players involved in constructing Netflix’s imagined audience, I turn to the 
materials released from the company and interviews with executives to analyze how they 
portray their audiences as data sets.  
 According to remarks made by Netflix communications director Joss Friedland in 
a November 2012 interview with Wired:  
We know what people watch on Netflix and we’re able with a high degree of 
confidence to understand how big a likely audience is for a given show based on 
people’s viewing habits. We want to continue to have something for everybody. 
But as time goes on, we get better at selecting what that something for everybody 
is that gets high engagement.18 
 
Whether for linear or nonlinear outlets, executives are always searching for the next TV 
show that will appeal to broad audiences, stimulate the process of engagement, and 
generate revenue. The key for Netflix is data collected through audience response, also 
known as big data. Television scholar Timothy Havens asserts that big data includes “the 
integration of digital recording, distribution, and data analysis technologies” in media 
industries.19 Havens argues that Netflix’s use of big data contributed to several major 
programming decisions, including House of Cards. Since the audience remains the 
“central obsession of the commercial media industries,” big data helps in predicting a 
program’s successful return on investment.20 Big data also, effectively, commoditizes the 
                                                
18 Roberto Baldwin, “Netflix Gambles on Big Data to Become the HBO of Streaming,” Wired, 
November 29, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/11/netflix-data-gamble/. 
 19 Timothy Havens, “Media Programming in an Era of Big Data,” Media Industries Journal 2, no. 
1 (2014): 5, http://www.mediaindustriesjournal.org/index.php/mij/article/view/43. 
 20 Ibid. 
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audience as Netflix makes purchasing decisions based on audience data. If Netflix did not 
have this system of measurement, they would depend upon the decisions of executives as 
well as the cruder Nielsen ratings system currency. While executives still have a say in 
the content chosen for Netflix viewers, publicly, the company’s reliance on big data 
makes for an engaging narrative and branding strategy. Instead of claiming a show came 
from a Hollywood executive, now it comes “from the people,” the people as data. 
Though, importantly, data “from the people” is constrained within the boundaries that 
Netflix has constructed. Netflix’s big data is also internally informed through their 
previous content purchases, particular program promotions, and how subscribers work 
within Netflix’s internally constructed constraints. 
Continuing to consider Netflix’s publicly promoted discourse – interaction with 
audiences as a feedback loop – PR and marketing teams rely on the discourse of 
“audiences as data” to construct Netflix’s image. However, the extent to which the 
company actually uses audience data to make and inform business decisions is unknown. 
The company’s programmers rely on “audiences as data” to publicly justify what they 
wish to license and acquire. Yet, in spite of all the rhetoric, big data and the Netflix 
algorithm is simply an updated version of audience testing and TV pilot screenings in 
Hollywood.21 Publicly, audiences are considered and constructed through data but 
executives still have the final say.  
 As emphasized in chapter one, Hulu’s audience is defined through multiple 
stakeholders (prominently, legacy media companies and advertisers) – even more than 
                                                
21 Todd Gitlin, Inside Prime Time (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). See chapter two. 
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Netflix. As such, Hulu’s feedback loop expands to include network affiliates, cable 
companies, and advertisers. Hulu’s construction of advertisers as business partners and 
advertisers as audiences (reminiscent of network television considering advertisers as 
audiences, supporting Smythe’s theory of audiences as commodities) is explored in a 
further section, but for now, I examine Hulu’s relationship with audiences as data. Like 
Netflix buying content that matches their data set, Hulu shows ads to audiences based on 
data. A one-sheet from Hulu’s advertising webpage includes a quote from Peter Naylor, 
SVP of Advertising, who says that “The marketplace has shown that data is 
overwhelmingly the new currency.” Both companies customize their product for their 
audiences based on user data, but in different ways according to their different 
relationships with key stakeholders. The data talked about on Hulu’s website is largely 
shaped by advertising needs. Data that comes from audience engagement with 
advertisements (taking quizzes, clicking on advertisements, choosing which 
advertisement to watch, etc.) is presently most valuable to Hulu. The company claims 
that its “goal for advertisers is to offer the highest quality of verifiable and measurable 
media for our clients.”22 Due to several factors, including that the company is privately 
owned, has fewer original series currently available, is not a market leader, and has 
unclear future business plans, Hulu does not rely on the same narrative that Netflix 
employs – namely, that audiences can be interpreted as measurable data to shape 
programming decisions.   
                                                
22 Hulu Advertising,” Hulu, n.d., http://www.hulu.com/advertising/research/. 
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IMAGINING AUDIENCES: AUDIENCES AS SUBSCRIBERS 
 Netflix and Hulu both use subscriber statistics as a proxy for audiences. As briefly 
stated earlier, the companies are interested in subscriber numbers, even if reports of these 
numbers do not figure prominently in much mainstream press coverage. Subscription 
numbers drive their revenue and appease stakeholders, so references to subscribers are 
mostly contained within quarterly reports and official corporate blog posts. Subscriber 
numbers, however, do not give information about audience engagement or what people 
actually watch. Or, to put it simply, subscriber numbers only detail the amount sold rather 
than the amount used.23 Insights into algorithms and data collection give more 
information about actual consumption patterns and usage than subscriber data, but both 
companies use and rely on subscription figures. Statistics like the following are 
commonly featured in reports and upfront presentations: “[Hulu] announced that its 
subscriber base has grown to nearly nine million subscribers, a 50% increase in 
subscriber base since 2014.”24 Perhaps evident but worth reaffirming, subscription 
numbers quantify money earned and thus, from the perspective of the industry, are an 
important way to consider audiences.  
Increasingly after 2012, Jason Kilar’s Hulu blog posts strategically situated Hulu 
as competing with other mass-market SVODs. Publicly addressing their success through 
graphs and statistics (Figure 1) gives the impression that Hulu makes money, courts 
                                                
23 Nielsen data is arguably trying to encompass viewership data (amount used/TV viewed). But, 
just because a television is on a particular channel does not mean anyone is watching. Though, Nielsen 
ratings are more relevant to viewership than subscription numbers. 
24 Press Admin User, “Hulu Announces Overall Growth and Unveils New Content Deals at 2015 
Upfront Presentation,” Hulu Press, April 29, 2015, http://www.hulu.com/press/posts/hulu-announces-
overall-growth-and-unveils-new-content-deals-at-2015-upfront-presentation. 
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subscribers, and can thus threaten the structure and practices of the legacy TV industry. 
However, Hulu’s goal pre-2012 was to court the industry and play nice with the content 
community and advertisers. As Hulu introduced original programs after 2012, their clear 
goals of appeasing their three stakeholders have become increasingly muddled. 
Demonstrating how Hulu used its construction of audiences-as-subscribers to account for 
their financial success, Kilar’s Q2 2011 post included company goals and marketing 
statements.25 For example, he provided a chart with the “slope of Hulu Plus’s subscriber 
ramp” (Figure 1) as faster than anticipated, aiming for one million subscribers by the end 
of summer, six months sooner than anticipated. Comparatively, by mid-2011 Netflix had 
25 million subscribers globally, 24.6 million of those in the United States.26 
 
                                                
25 Jason Kilar, “Q2,” Hulu, July 6, 2011, http://blog.hulu.com/2011/07/06/q2/. 




Figure 1: Hulu Plus Paid Subscribers27 
In the same post, Kilar also explained how the company appeased the content 
community: “we proudly and profitably pay the content community approximately $8 per 
subscriber per month for the content offering you see today on Hulu Plus. A portion of 
the $8 payment to the content community comes from our $7.99 subscription fee; the 
balance comes from the revenue we generate through advertising.”28 This is similar to a 
cable model, which makes money from advertising and program packages, in addition to 
service delivery fees, and cable box rental fees. Kilar also listed the various platforms on 
which viewers can access Hulu Plus, as well as continued growth in Hulu Plus’s content 
library. In terms of appeasing advertisers, he noted that “Hulu serves nearly 2x the 
number of video advertisements of the next largest advertising service [Adap.tv, now part 
of ONE by AOL].”29  
Four years later, in October 2015, Hulu announced it was adding a more 
expensive subscription option. When Hulu announced this ad-free version, (priced at 
$11.99 per month) the company reasoned it was “to get people on Twitter off its back.”30 
It makes sense that a subsection of subscribers complained about advertisements on Hulu. 
Any other comparable subscription video service (Netflix, Amazon Prime, HBO Now, 
Showtime) does not include advertisements. In customers’ minds, they were paying to get 
rid of ads on these other services, why not Hulu too? Hulu’s argument, and public appeal, 
                                                
 27 Kilar, “Q2.” 
 28 Ibid. 
 29 Ibid. 
30 Mike Shields, “Hulu Haters on Twitter Spurred Ad-Free Option,” The Wall Street Journal, 
October 28, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/hulu-haters-on-twitter-spurred-ad-free-option-1446064123. 
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said the main perk of an original (advertising-included) Hulu Plus subscription was 
access to more content – a larger library. By adding an advertising-free subscription tier, 
and attributing this decision to audience feedback, Hulu presented itself as appeasing and 
catering to their subscriber-base. Hulu’s most recent CEO, Mike Hopkins, publicly stated 
that he did not think most people will pay for the extra tier, but providing it as an option 
speaks to Hulu’s respect for their audience and their desire to cultivate a strong 
relationship with subscribers. Hopkins’ forward thinking was accurate. Months later, he 
reported many customers did not purchase the commercial-free plan (those numbers are 
not public) and, “Almost overnight, complaints about advertising stopped because 
consumers know the bargain.”31  
Further analyzing the rhetoric used in the ad-free addition announcement shows 
another, less positive angle of Hulu’s attitude toward audiences. “Getting the Twitter 
users off their back” does not portray a particularly positive relationship between Hulu 
and its audience. While Hopkins attributes the decision to the vocal Twitter group, the 
turn of phrase reveals the company’s reluctance. Perhaps their public reluctance was due 
to Hulu’s corporate owners. Advertising is a crucial part of broadcast television. When 
the top-tier subscription got rid of advertising, framing it as a reluctant decision – a 
decision just to get Twitter users off of their backs – still maintains Hulu’s status as part 
of broadcast television.  
                                                
31 Todd Spangler, “Hulu CEO Mike Hopkins: Service Will Grow Ad Share With Better 
Measurement,” Variety, November 20, 2015, http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/hulu-ceo-mike-hopkins-
advertising-data-1201645483/. 
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In the documents utilized above, Netflix and Hulu carefully invoke subscriber 
numbers to appease shareholders, content creators, or advertisers. While advertising 
pages, one-sheets, and shareholder letters are available to the public, they are foremost 
written for intra-industry stakeholders. Audiences as subscribers feeds into the industry-
held idea that a monthly monetary exchange proves success. However, this data does not 
prove engagement or how particular viewers consider the platform. Audiences as 
subscribers are only valuable within the industry itself, elsewhere the construct is 
arbitrary. 
IMAGINING AUDIENCES: ADVERTISING AGENCIES  
 Advertisers have courted younger consumers (18-49 year olds) for decades due to 
the long-standing industry belief that this demographic has the most disposable income 
and the most time to get (and remain) hooked on a product. With the concept of the 
millennial generation dominating journalistic discussions of branding and marketing 
products32, and due to its reliance on advertising revenue, Hulu has intermittently prized 
the millennial audience (though this demographic focus is only within a larger business 
model of taking whatever audience they can get). In Hulu’s blog aimed specifically at 
advertising companies, they have touted that their audience is skewed “significantly 
younger than broadcast TV and DVR viewers.”33 In a promotional video produced in 
2015, they claim that 52% of subscribers are 18-34 year olds, and 92% of all 18-34 year 
                                                
 32 Melissa Hoffmann, “Attention Brands: This Is How You Get Millennials to Like You: Looking 
at What Resonates Most With Marketers’ Dream Demo,” Adweek, October 6, 2014, 
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/attention-brands-how-you-get-millennials-you-160575. 
33 Hiram Reid, “Hulu Delivers Millennials,” Hulu Advertising, April 6, 2015, 
http://www.hulu.com/advertising/hulu-delivers-millennials/. 
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olds claim to skip advertisements. Importantly, on Hulu, it is almost impossible to skip 
advertisements, and if consumers are able to skip ads, advertising companies are not 
charged for ads that do not play from start to finish. This makes Hulu “a solution” for 
advertising companies frightened by DVRs and fast-forwarding capabilities. Hulu spends 
a significant amount of time and money courting advertising agencies – money that is not 
similarly spent by Netflix. As such, ad agencies should be considered part of Hulu’s 
audience, especially when viewing Hulu’s audience through their appeals to advertisers. 
 Hulu’s website, hulu.com/advertising, is a hub for advertising agencies to browse 
the advertising opportunities that Hulu provides. Advertising agencies can view the type 
of ads – traditional commercial video spots, interactive quizzes or games, companion 
banners or sidebars, or brand/product placement within original programs – they might 
wish to purchase for Hulu’s website. There is also a list of sponsorships available, and an 
entire section dedicated to advertising specifically with Hulu Originals. While the blog 
posts and trade press are pitched at Hulu’s three customer groups of end users, 
advertisers, and content suppliers, this advertising page caters specifically to advertising 
agencies. On the Hulu Originals page, the company lists three reasons to advertise with 
the company: “Break ground on Hulu with never-been-done executions. Brand 
association with tent-pole original content that’s defining pop culture. Drive brand results 
beyond the use of standard ad units & creative.”34 Partnership elements include “Organic 
brand integrations into story arcs across multiple episodes. Product placement throughout 
the season. Leverage show characters to develop custom content. Unique integrated 
                                                
34 “Hulu Originals,” Hulu Advertising, n.d., http://www.hulu.com/advertising/hulu-originals/. 
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marketing activation around the series. Premium media placements within the series.”35 
Hulu’s pitch to advertisers shows its roots in linear television, drawing from common 
advertising strategies on linear television, such as product placement. Revealing Hulu’s 
in-between position of legacy brand and new technology, it also attempts to differentiate 
itself from linear television with how the platform offers something different, calling 
their product “Advanced TV.”  
In a separate “Advanced TV” one-sheet, Hulu states their Advanced TV buying is 
“the next evolution.”36 For Hulu, Advanced TV is the combination of the right ad, for the 
right person, at the right time – this basically involves targeting specific demographics 
using viewer data and advertising data. Hulu lists seven unique value propositions here, 
including “Younger audience, lighter ad load, unskippable ads, effective targeting, 
industry-leading viewability, #1 safe site for brands, and 100% ad completion.” This 
advertising page emphasizes that Hulu sees their company as unique, fresh, relevant, and 
willing to try new things through advertising. In regards to their audience, Hulu reiterates 
its prioritization of youthfulness at the same time it claims advertiser satisfaction. Hulu’s 
promotions made for advertising agencies show its unique position, how the company 
straddles linear and nonlinear television, and its appeals to younger audiences and 
traditional advertising companies. 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 “Advanced TV One-Sheet_FINAL,” Hulu, n.d., 
https://hulu.app.box.com/s/ay9ozgmthhut05h30gguppzd7dal2jif. 
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THEORIZING WATCHING BEHAVIORS 
 The way Netflix and Hulu release their original programs sheds light on how they 
view their subscribers/audiences, and how they believe their subscribers will watch their 
programs. How audiences watch something is an important area of emphasis in television 
studies37, and how a program is presented to an audience (or which choices are given to 
audiences) is critical to think about when analyzing these two companies’ practices. Both 
services present themselves as giving their audience “choice,” but two different 
conceptions of choice will be revealed in this analysis. 
Both mainstream and trade publications help to make binge watching 
synonymous with catching up on already-aired television content and, in particular, 
Netflix Originals. Binge viewing differs depending on those defining it. Scholar Mareike 
Jenner surveyed journalistic, popular, and industrial discourses that listed the 
qualifications of “binging.” In an official press release, Netflix cited 73% of people 
surveyed quantified binge watching as watching between two and six episodes, while The 
Atlantic journalist Nolan Feeney inserts a caveat and separates hour and half hour 
programs in his definition.38 I am in agreement with Jenner’s claim that binge viewing is 
“subjective” and “in relation to one’s own media consumption.”39 Though the definition 
remains subjective per individual user, Netflix releases their original content in a way that 
can be easily binged, with full seasons dropped at midnight on a Friday – prime time for a 
                                                
 37 See Spigel, Make Room for TV; Tamar Liebes and Elihu Katz, The Export of Meaning: Cross-
Cultural Readings of Dallas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
 38 Jenner, “Binge-watching,” 4. 
 39 Ibid. 
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weekend’s consumption. This gives subscribers the opportunity to watch it all on that 
Friday, over the course of a week, thirteen weeks, or throughout the year.  
 Even before the first season of House of Cards debuted on Netflix in 2012, the 
company’s communications director, Joss Friedland, declared the binge model would, 
“change the way people look at television. By putting all 13 episodes out on the same day 
giving everyone the opportunity to watch it at their own pace is going to be a major 
moment. We put consumers in charge of their own experience. It’s going to be an 
interesting time.”40 Sarandos similarly claimed that, “there’s no reason to release [House 
of Cards] weekly” because of his opinion that the culture has “move[d] away from 
appointment television.”41 As mentioned earlier, data collected by the company regarding 
people’s consumption practices led them to decide to release full seasons at a time. 
 Inversely, Hulu has continued with the weekly release model, thereby 
differentiating its platform and exposing its stakes in broadcast television. If subscribers 
want to see the latest Hulu original series, they must wait a week between episodes to 
watch, or wait a few months for the full season to debut and binge/create their own 
schedule. SVP and head of content Craig Erwich advocates for the shared viewing 
experience, a weekly release schedule allows viewers to “discover” Hulu series in real 
time, and allows viewers to simulate terrestrial television habits by watching multiple 
                                                
40 Roberto Baldwin, “Netflix Gambles on Big Data to Become the HBO of Streaming,” Wired, 
November 29, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/11/netflix-data-gamble/. 
41 Alan Sepinwall, “Ted Talk: State of the Netflix Union Discussion with Chief Content Officer 
Ted Sarandos,” Hitfix, January 26, 2016, http://www.hitfix.com/whats-alan-watching/ted-talk-state-of-the-
netflix-union-discussion-with-chief-content-officer-ted-sarandos. 
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shows at once and keeping a “steady stream of shows premiering.”42 As mentioned in 
chapter one, the weekly release model also evokes Hulu’s ties to TV and media 
conglomerates. Audiences are urged to watch Hulu like network or cable TV, connecting 
the process of persuading particular audience behavior to its conglomerate ownership. 
 For Netflix, the company urges audiences to watch their programs in ways 
different from Hulu and thus, linear TV. As such, Netflix’s algorithms must be 
considered once again. After generating a list of genres and tags in 2006, the SVOD 
changed its recommendation feature from requesting users rate films with a certain 
number of stars (“You would give this film 5-stars, it seems like you would like it”) to a 
more language/genre-based system of recommendations (e.g., “Recommended for you: 
Dramas Featuring a Strong Female Lead”). Todd Yellin, Netflix’s VP of Product, 
explained the rationale for the change:  
Predicting something is 3.2 stars is kind of fun if you have an engineering 
sensibility, but it would be more useful to talk about dysfunctional families and 
viral plagues. We wanted to put in more language. We wanted to highlight our 
personalization because we pride ourselves on putting the right title in front of the 
right person at the right time.43 
 
Through its personalized recommendation system, Netflix wants to guide watching 
habits/behaviors. Recommending the right movie or TV show at the right time, from 
Netflix’s perspective, encourages viewers to continue to come back and sample more of 
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their content.44 Building original content that reflects this range and personalization 
further enables the success of this model. Sarandos considers Netflix’s brand to be 
“personalization…we didn’t want any show to define Netflix…[Netflix wants] the best 
shows from everyone in the world for everyone in the world.”45 These shows are then 
categorized and internally quantified to present themselves to viewers. This process 
includes two concepts the company continually reiterates and considers part of their 
brand: personalization and data. These two distinctive abilities are targets for competition 
and invoke concern for linear television companies. 
HOW COMPETITORS DEFINE NETFLIX VIEWERSHIP 
Netflix’s lack of transparency and tight hold of data and viewership information 
makes scholarship about Netflix’s viewership quite difficult. However, it justifies the 
following discursive analysis. Other media companies must get creative if they want to 
try to understand what Netflix knows. Netflix constructs and caters to an audience based 
on the ways it provides recommendations, acquires content, and advertises to the public. 
To better understand how the nonlinear viewing audience is conceptualized, we can 
examine the way other media companies talk about products and platforms to the public. 
Unfortunately, there are limited occasions in which to access Netflix’s data – and the 
                                                
 44 I have found that Netflix more frequently promotes its Originals programs as the first visible 
recommendation on the top of the website, as well as in the “Trending Now” and “Recently Added” 
sections, and even within a dedicated “Netflix Originals” section label. Though this may reflect my past 
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45 Alan Sepinwall, “Ted Talk: State of the Netflix Union Discussion with Chief Content Officer 
Ted Sarandos,” Hitfix, January 26, 2016, http://www.hitfix.com/whats-alan-watching/ted-talk-state-of-the-
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release of their data is often highly selective and controlled for maximum public relations 
impact. It is worth considering the few moments where the data slips through the cracks, 
so to speak –where Netflix releases certain statistics or, more interestingly in my opinion, 
when other media companies go rogue. Frequently, media companies release statements 
speculating about Netflix’s viewership, but occasionally, companies try to quantify 
Netflix’s viewership and release that data to the public. 
Famously, in January 2016 at a Television Critics Association (TCA) luncheon, 
NBCUniversal President of Research and Media Development Alan Wurtzel revealed 
ratings for Netflix original TV series, including Jessica Jones (2015-), Master of None 
(2015-), and Narcos.46 Wurtzel conducted a ratings study through Symphony Advanced 
Media, a company that uses a mobile app to track media interactions in real time. The app 
collects information on a user’s interaction with TV content (by capturing the soundtrack 
of the show), advertising, mobile apps, social media, Internet searching, GPS, and more.47 
Symphony’s panel included 15,000 users, and the company stated that its goal involved 
“Measuring what people do rather than what they say.”48 Symphony’s company goal and 
data tracking method, again, bring up a focus on engagement. Symphony measures “what 
people do,” meaning, how they interact and engage. Quantifying engagement has become 
more valuable to Wurtzel – especially in relation to the latter part of the goal, “rather than 
what they say.” Historically, Nielsen has used viewing diaries and had its survey 
                                                
46 Michael O’Connell and Lesley Goldberg, “NBC Exec Outs Netflix Ratings for ‘Jessica Jones,’ 
‘Master of None,’ More,” The Hollywood Reporter, January 13, 2016, 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/nbc-exec-outs-netflix-ratings-855642. 
47 “How It Works,” Symphony Advanced Media, n.d., http://www.symphonyam.com/technology/. 
48 “Home Page,” Symphony Advanced Media, n.d., http://www.symphonyam.com. 
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participants write down their television consumption throughout the week. Nielsen’s 
diaries have been called out by industries as being subjective and inaccurate. Symphony 
counters that claim and positions itself as objective. This values and equates “real data” 
with what people do, and “fake data” with what people say, which relates to a larger 
industrial trend, valuing big data and its measurement of engagement. 
Instead of focusing on Wurtzel and Symphony’s actual viewership data, what is 
of interest to me is Wurtzel’s publicly declared purpose for collecting and sharing the 
data. Understanding why Wurtzel contributed to the Netflix viewership mystery is 
important in building a more complete definition of Netflix’s relationship with the 
television industry. Wurtzel’s main goal in sharing these figures at TCA was to demystify 
viewership numbers, to prove Netflix did not pose a threat to NBCUniversal (Netflix’s 
numbers “pale in comparison”49), and to put Netflix’s business model in perspective, 
especially for the critics and journalists at TCA. Wurtzel said, “Their business model is to 
make you write a check next month…I don’t believe there’s enough stuff on Netflix that 
is broad enough and is consistent enough to effect us in a meaningful way on a regular 
basis.”50 Ultimately, Wurtzel is completely differentiating network TV and SVOD TV, 
through their different business models (advertising vs. subscription), extent of their 
library (range of content), and scope (broadcast/narrowcast). Thus, he also is making a 
                                                
49 Olivia Armstrong, “NBC Slams Netflix at TCA, Says Streaming Series Ratings ‘Pale in 
Comparison’ to Broadcast,” Decider, January 14, 2016, http://decider.com/2016/01/14/nbc-exec-slams-
netflix-ratings-tca-2016/. 
50 Michael O’Connell and Lesley Goldberg, “NBC Exec Outs Netflix Ratings for ‘Jessica Jones,’ 
‘Master of None,’ More,” The Hollywood Reporter, January 13, 2016, 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/nbc-exec-outs-netflix-ratings-855642. 
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judgment about network audiences in relation to SVOD audiences – namely, that viewers 
are seeking something different from each service.  
After Wurtzel presented this data at the TCAs, Ted Sarandos responded to the 
validity of the figures provided and gave clues about Netflix’s viewership tracking 
practices. Sarandos stated that the data was “remarkably inaccurate” and that “the 
methodology doesn’t reflect any sense of reality we keep track of.”51  Sarandos’s response 
is an attempt to prove that Netflix still knows its audience, but has different priorities. 
Nevertheless, Sarandos and Wurtzel both construct the audience, respective of their data 
sets, in targeted ways. Wurtzel’s data from Symphony focused on the demographic of 18-
49 year olds, which Sarandos says Netflix does not track. The company has not released 
data broken down by demographics. Instead of constructed demographics (historically 
used for TV advertising agencies), Netflix counts when people are “pressing start on a 
Netflix original,” thus, “There is not an apples to apples comparison to Netflix watching 
and any Nielsen rating.”52 Sarandos is actually mirroring Wurtzel’s point, again: there is 
something fundamentally different in how NBCUniversal conceives of an audience and 
how Netflix conceives of an audience. But both are desperate to capture and understand 
audiences. How each tracks their own audience reflects back on their unique definitions 
of success. 
                                                
51 Michael O’Connell, “Netflix’s Ted Sarandos Reacts to NBC Outing His Ratings: ‘Remarkably 




HOW NETFLIX DEFINES SUCCESS 
Success for both Netflix and Hulu becomes challenging to assess without access 
to internal corporate documents. Through raw subscription numbers, as of 2015 (the last 
time Hulu released subscription numbers), Netflix dominated the market with 60 million 
global subscribers (40 million located in the U.S.), with Hulu trailing behind significantly 
with nine million subscribers. Hulu’s number does not include the number of people who 
have watched Hulu without a subscription, and the company does not make this data 
available. Since neither company has to release audience data, it is difficult to claim one 
platform is performing better than the other except in terms of these raw subscription 
numbers. But to survive within the larger television industry, both must cultivate a sense 
of superiority, stellar performance, and active audience engagement to remain 
competitive and relevant. Drawing on what these companies personally count as 
“success,” carefully cultivated statistics and media blurbs do not give a full view of their 
performance in the industry relative to other SVODs, network, cable, or premium cable 
TV. However, what a discussion of perceived success, as defined and promoted by 
Netflix, provides is a way to think through the company’s priorities as well as the shifting 
cultural and industrial positioning of television.  
Netflix’s priorities, much like traditional TV channels, still revolve around 
imagined audiences. But, as Sarandos emphasized in his response to Wurtzel, Netflix’s 
conception of audiences is different from linear television companies. As television 
scholar Jason Mittell writes in The Atlantic, “Netflix simply doesn’t care about ratings – 
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at least not in the way other television providers do.”53 Netflix still cares about ratings, to 
be sure, but this is a new conception of ratings. Such a new conception must be examined 
and considered in future SVOD studies and by television studies scholars more generally. 
The most common ways that Netflix has defined success have been through 
award nominations/wins (an appeal to taste cultures), occasional PR releases that include 
viewer and subscriber data (quantifying success), and by marketing high levels of cultural 
relevance (success measured by engagement).54 Netflix occasionally lists quite general 
statistics on viewership in their quarterly reports or through press releases. For example, 
2015’s Q1 reports include the following viewership data: “House of Cards, in its third 
season, had its biggest launch yet in terms of viewers.” It also noted critical acclaim: 
“Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt…winning Rotten Tomatoes scores of 90%+ from both 
critics and viewers,” as well as perceived audience response, “[the company was] 
delighted by the fan excitement and critical response around last Friday’s launch of 
Marvel’s Daredevil.”55 By Q4 2015, the focus was on end-of-year lists, with Marvel’s 
Jessica Jones, Master of None, Narcos, Sense8, Marvel’s Daredevil, and Bloodline all 
noted for securing a spot on IMDb’s “Top 10 new TV shows of 2015.” IMDb is a 
noteworthy choice because the website is based on viewer ratings and votes, not the 
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assessment of television critics.56 The choice to feature this information further 
underscored that Netflix increasingly relied on cultural engagement and popular hype to 
dictate success. Another example of Netflix using cultural relevance to define success is 
through their discussion of the documentary series Making a Murderer (2015) within the 
Q1 2015 shareholder letter. The SVOD service claimed that the show “triggered a 
national conversation on fairness of the American criminal justice system.” The Q1 2015 
letter provided a link to the Making a Murderer Rotten Tomatoes webpage. The Rotten 
Tomatoes page lists high critical and audience acclaim for the show. The letter also links 
to a People story on “Who Killed Teresa?” inspired by the documentary series.57 The 
2015 Q4 report included information on the brand’s reputation, citing two studies that 
name Netflix as 2015’s number two “best-loved brand” from Adweek and as included a 
top ten “most relevant” brands from Prophet, explored in more detail through chapter 
three’s case studies.58 After linking to these studies, Netflix claimed that their “all digital 
approach makes us efficient and relevant to active Internet users everywhere.”59  
                                                
56 Bill Bradley, “The Top 10 New Shows of 2015, According to IMDb,” Huffpost TV, December 
23, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/top-new-shows-2015-
imdb_us_5668a505e4b009377b23b326. 
57 Sandra Sobieraj Westfall and Tara Fowler, “Who Killed Teresa? The Untold Story Behind 
‘Making a Murderer,’” People, January 13, 2016, http://www.people.com/article/making-a-murderer-who-
killed-teresa. 
58 “Apple, Samsung and Microsoft Named Most Relevant Brands by Prophet’s New Brand 
Relevance Index,” Prophet, January 11, 2016, https://www.prophet.com/about/news/658-apple-samsung-
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years-best-loved-brands-hint-half-are-probably-younger-you-168930. 
 59 Hastings and Wells, “Q4 2015.” 
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From these blurbs that Netflix touts in its quarterly reports, it is clear that the 
company cares about people as both subscribers (for monetary purposes) and viewers (for 
engagement purposes), and that in fact the two are symbiotic for the company. Building 
hype by remaining a relevant brand, winning awards, and making top ten lists leads to 
subscribers that become viewers. I agree with Mittell’s claim, that for Netflix, at least 
externally, “actual popularity is less important than perceived popularity.”60 Netflix’s 
marketing strategies strongly construct and promote perceived popularity. Nonetheless, 
actual popularity is still important when it comes to appeasing shareholders and content 
producers, because actual popularity translates into income (and loss of churn). Netflix 
envisions its product as more successful the more people that subscribe, tweet, and share 
Netflix experiences. This is a different type of popularity than tuning in at 8 p.m. Eastern 
time on a Thursday to gain ratings. Sarandos outlines his criteria for success directly 
when he asks, “Is it drawing an audience? ... Is it getting positive reception from fans, 
from you guys, from the critical reception...Is the show positive to Netflix?”61 There is 
clearly a balance of numerical popularity, critical acclaim, and brand building happening 
in Netflix’s discussion of success.    
CONCLUSION 
 In carrying over chapter one’s discussion of these two companies, when viewing 
Netflix and Hulu’s conceptions of their audiences, we can further see how various players 
                                                
60 Jason Mittell, “Why Netflix Doesn’t Release Its Ratings,” The Atlantic, February 23, 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/02/netflix-ratings/462447/. 
61 Alan Sepinwall, “Ted Talk: State of the Netflix Union Discussion with Chief Content Officer 
Ted Sarandos,” Hitfix, January 26, 2016, http://www.hitfix.com/whats-alan-watching/ted-talk-state-of-the-
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are involved in framing our cultural understandings of SVODs and their audiences. There 
are relationships among shareholders, audiences, advertisers, officers, directors, and 
content creators all informing one another, all with various amounts of power and 
control. It is a complex web of input, feedback, provoking expressions, and creating 
impressions.  
 Similar to Ang’s understanding of audiences in the broadcast era, Netflix and 
Hulu construct audience groups for industry purposes. Audiences are industrially created 
abstractions used in the interest of institutions.62 The ways audiences are grouped, 
especially as data and as subscribers, reflect larger changes in the television industry. 
Technology enables Netflix and Hulu to track audiences differently, through “big data,” 
which they promote as more valuable than the older Nielsen methods. Legacy 
companies’ competitive responses, and attempts to track linear television like Internet 
usage (Symphony’s measurement system), reveal how big data is privileged in this era. 
The next chapter will take a look at some specific examples of advertisements, 
original TV content produced for Netflix and Hulu, and social media material in order to 
track the end product: the construction of content. How does content matter to these 
companies? How does this content (i.e., product) help to maintain audiences? I see this 
happening, primarily, through brand building carried over from TV channel strategies as 
well as attempts at audience engagement, efforts to build and sustain brand relevance in 
the evolving digital space. 
 
                                                
 62 Ang, Desperately Seeking, 2. 
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Chapter Three 
Building Business Models, Brand Strategies, and Subscriber Bases: Two 
Approaches 
 Chapter one laid out business foundations of Netflix and Hulu, their stakeholders, 
forays into original content, competitors, and broader industrial discourse. The second 
chapter explored how these SVODs build, imagine, and consider audience groups: as 
data, as subscribers, and for advertisers. This chapter builds on the framework laid out in 
the first two chapters by looking at and analyzing paratexts, advertisements, social media 
campaigns, and promotions. In particular, the promotional tools discussed here support, 
complicate, and challenge company discourse about creating and implementing brand 
categories while targeting demographics and audiences. Each advertisement and social 
media post is analyzed in two ways: in relation to the brand identity the companies are 
attempting to cultivate and in relation to their imagined audiences. I examine the 
marketing strategies employed by these outlets to maintain the brand of the platform, 
build the show’s brand identity, and sustain subscribers/audiences for the service.  
 There are two main through-lines in this chapter’s case studies. First, I argue that 
Netflix and Hulu’s advertising, branding strategies, and marketing campaigns imagine 
audience in particular ways (increasingly imagined as fans) and encourage specific 
modes of engagement. The media industries have encouraged some of the practices and 
tropes commonly ascribed to fans, fan productions, and fandom – in particular, sharing 
art and video on social media, producing content, forming communities, and 
rewatching/marathoning shows. These industry strategies reflect widespread industrial 
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patterns of social media practices, emphasis on engagement, and engagement used to 
quantify and determine success. Instances of industries adapting fan practices have been 
theorized in fan scholarship from Bertha Chin and Matthias Stork, who acknowledge that 
fans can take pleasure from and/or feel exploited when industries take up their production 
practices.1  
At the same time, such brand strategies (and appeals to fans) are also common to 
SVODs, which communicate their valuation of public engagement (instead of numerical 
data, more so than linear television) in order to illustrate their popularity to the press and 
public. Targeting fan bases, most often linked to TV shows, also helps Netflix and Hulu 
maintain their brand. This appeal maintains brand relevance for Netflix and Hulu, 
especially to their most prized demographic: audiences consuming TV series through 
online platforms. Secondly, through an examination of Netflix and Hulu’s content 
acquisitions and promotional materials, I illustrate how they address – and juggle – the 
concerns of their stakeholders: maintaining subscribers and turning a profit. In the 
process, one can see two different ownerships and business models at work, and how 
those models intersect with means of imagining and interacting with audiences. 
 These case studies reveal key points of divergence in Netflix and Hulu, which 
reflect the differences in business models (see chapter one). Netflix constructed a strong, 
all-encompassing brand. So, when referring to watching habits, audiences tend to frame 
                                                
 1 See Chin, “Sherlockology.” Stork, “The Cultural Economics.” 
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their engagement with the platform as “watching Netflix.”2 Hulu’s audiences highlight 
their engagement by citing particular content available on the platform. Netflix’s strong 
brand status, as of the mid 2010s, shows its early transition to streaming and strong 
original content bid, while Hulu’s brand remains blurry, straddling legacy and new 
technology company goals. Hulu’s brand is blurred further with its appeals to numerous 
stakeholders laid out in chapter one, most importantly, appealing to advertisers. Netflix’s 
brand can, at times, contradict itself as it advertises to “everyone” as its key demographic. 
Simultaneously, the company focused on turning casual users into frequent users, 
privileging a demographic they categorize as “fans.” Unlike Netflix, Hulu’s Originals 
brand occasionally targets millennials; presumably hoping this generation will engage on 
social media and remain lifelong subscribers. But Hulu’s vast amount of previously aired 
programming and film selection shows the platform’s efforts to target a broader audience. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: BRANDING TELEVISION 
Before starting the case studies, a discussion and overview of the pertinent 
branding literature is necessary. Branding has become an extremely important practice in 
global popular culture and media businesses. As detailed in Adam Arvidsson and Tiziano 
Bonini’s article, “Valuing Audience Passions,” there is utility in drawing from Dallas W. 
Smythe’s theory on the culture of branding among industries, viewers, and advertisers.3 
Updating Smythe’s work, Arvidsson and Bonini claim a new style of consumption began 
                                                
 2 Jason Lynch, “Here’s Why Consumers Love Netflix More Than Amazon and Hulu,” Adweek, 
June 24, 2015, http://www.adweek.com/news/television/here-s-why-consumers-love-netflix-more-amazon-
and-hulu-165547. 
3 Adam Arvidsson and Tiziano Bonini, “Valuing Audience Passions: From Smythe to Tarde,” 
European Journal of Cultural Studies 18, no. 2 (April 2015): 158–73. 
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in the mid-twentieth century as media industries worked to transform viewership 
practices into audience commodities that could be sold to advertisers.4 Media industries 
and products, including broadcasting and magazines, structured and situated audience 
attention in predictable ways, thus leading to a greater return on investment and helping 
to ensure a larger percentage of viewers purchased products. This process of “situating” 
the audience transformed throughout the twentieth century, but the introduction and 
widespread use of demographics in the 1950s and psychographics in the 1960s and 
1970s, marked an especially important moment for marketing teams involved in selling 
engagement. Arvidsson and Bonini argue that psychographic data and other newer forms 
of twenty-first century data collection – such as Nielsen’s audiometers and, I argue, 
Netflix’s algorithms and Hulu’s access to big data – gave way to multifaceted audience 
data, and considers both passions (i.e., the strength of audiences’ affective ties, combined 
with audience consumption over time) and noise (i.e., media landscape in spaces outside 
of the home).5 In the current media landscape, the focus on audience passion is due to the 
fragmentation of audiences and the perceived ability to understand passion, owing to the 
availability of diverse, detailed data. Companies must work to sustain passions, especially 
consumption practices and engagement, in order to predict and sustain consumer 
behavior.6  
                                                
4 Ibid., 161. 
5 Ibid., 163 
6 Ibid., 168; See Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green, Spreadable Media: Creating Value 
and Meaning in a Networked Culture (New York: New York University Press, 2013). 
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A more direct connection between audiences, branding, and television is made 
apparent in Catherine Johnson’s Branding Television, where she explores the history of 
popular brands tied to certain TV channels. Through a case study that explores basic 
cable channel MTV, Johnson argues that television has historically relied on both product 
differentiation and niche branding strategies; Johnson finds that the MTV brand 
historically has conveyed a certain set of values to audiences, upscale and youthful, a 
particularly attractive audience commodity for advertisers.7 In addition, she shows how 
channels like HBO have constructed ties to Hollywood, award ceremonies, sports 
programming, and documentaries. Collectively, HBO’s branding strategies convey 
“quality.”8 Johnson writes, “HBO’s move towards original programming [in the 1990s] 
could be seen as an attempt to construct a brand identity over which it ha[d] more 
control.”9  
Johnson’s argument can be updated to Netflix and Hulu’s original programming 
forays in certain key ways. Both companies use original programming to support their 
business models and cultivate their brand identities. In her book, Johnson looks at Hulu 
as a case study, though her case study was initiated before the company began offering 
subscriptions and original series. She argues that Hulu’s brand has been “defined by the 
experience that Hulu offers to its viewers” because Hulu aims to offer consumers a range 
of programming.10 More concretely, Johnson argues, “What Hulu offers is an experience 
                                                
7 Catherine Johnson, Branding Television (New York and London: Routledge, 2012) 17-19. 
8 Ibid., 30. 
9 Ibid., 33. 
10 Ibid., 55. 
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defined by what you can do with television.”11 Johnson’s focus on “experience” marks 
Hulu’s digital space as interactive, focused on engagement, and creating a distinctly 
branded environment. Since Hulu (at the time of Johnson’s book release in 2012) did not 
offer a subscription service, Johnson aligns Hulu predominantly with free-to-air network 
television channels. However, with the addition of Hulu Plus in 2010 and original content 
in 2012, in 2016 parts of the service (e.g., its two subscription options and original 
content distribution) also align with HBO and other premium channels’ objectives.  
This chapter, through its case studies of Netflix and Hulu’s advertisements, social 
media posts, and engagement strategies, will bring Johnson’s framework up to date and 
complicate how Netflix and Hulu brand certain values of engagement. Netflix and Hulu’s 
brands each reveal sets of publicly recognized business values (broad choice, 
engagement, and personalization) while working to both increase and sustain subscription 
numbers. Also important to consider, the press and critical rhetoric cited in this chapter 
tend to uncritically replicate official channel branding strategies and programming 
choices by circulating official memos and conducting interviews with executives.12 
NETFLIX VS. HULU BRAND STRATEGIES  
 This section provides a brief overview of Netflix and Hulu’s branding strategies 
during the period relevant to this thesis, 2007 to 2016. While the introduction and 
previous chapters have surveyed the two companies’ corporate structures, business 
models, and means of imagining audiences – all of which encompasses parts of their 
                                                
11 Ibid., 56. 
12 Ibid., 31. 
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brand recognition – it is necessary to briefly return to key points before proceeding with 
this chapter’s case studies. Unlike Johnson’s case study of MTV, where a channel’s 
brand stands in for the niche demographic the channel seeks to serve, for the most part, 
Netflix and Hulu’s brands as platforms are not tailored to niche demographics. I admit 
that Hulu, at times, explicitly brands programs to millennials. When Hulu links its brand 
to a millennial audience, the company is directly addressing advertising agencies – those 
most interested in gaining millennial consumers. This is explored further in a case study 
in the following section. As mentioned, a niche brand goes against these services’ 
primary business goal of acquiring a broad, diverse base of subscribers and maintaining 
supportive relationships with both advertisers and shareholders. Their overall goal is to 
acquire a broad audience, which, at times, Hulu accomplishes by targeting a specific 
group. When Hulu targets millennials, however, it is aimed to promote the end goal of 
increasing subscribers, regardless of their demographic, and securing advertisement 
deals. 
In lieu of a specific brand identity, Netflix and Hulu situate their platforms as 
more generalized landing places for users – where audiences are guaranteed to find a 
wide range of quality content tailored to their personal tastes. This brand identity is 
demonstrated in a 2015 study from iModerate, a consumer insights firm. When asked 
about their viewing habits, users mention “watching Netflix.”13 Audiences are watching a 
brand – listing a platform’s name instead of a specific show. In contrast, Hulu subscribers 
claimed to watch Hulu for a specific show. iModerate notes, as I argue in the pages to 
                                                
13 Lynch, “Here’s Why Consumers.” 
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follow, that Hulu’s acquisition of The Mindy Project and its distribution of other original 
shows with recognizable talent should provide a boost for Hulu’s brand identity 
(“watching Hulu”). Hulu’s brand growth and strategy indicates the company strives to be 
defined by its brand, like Netflix, not just its content. This matches advice from brand 
strategists in the early 2010s, as Prophet (a brand and marketing consultancy) Vice 
Chairman David Aaker stresses brand identity and relevance as key to market survival. 14 
 Netflix’s brand identity – in which consuming diverse content through a 
streaming platform is equated with “watching Netflix” – is directly tied to its brand 
relevance. Industry logic maintains that the more relevant a brand, the greater the chance 
that consumers will engage with the brand. Brand strategists recommend building a new 
category or subcategory. “Category,” a brand strategist term, refers to a market sector that 
serves a particular need.15 New categories or subcategories provide unique, valuable 
services – differentiation is key. Netflix has built a strong “category,” making its brand 
synonymous with high quality online streaming television and film. Netflix’s streaming 
subscription offer was first in its category, clearly defined itself, and then slowly 
differentiated its brand through the introduction of original content. Hulu did not create 
an original category since its initial mission essentially repackaged broadcast television 
as, in effect, a DVR (with commercials) available online. However, with the introduction 
of Hulu Plus and Hulu Originals, the company has been actively trying to differentiate 
                                                
14 David Aaker, Brand Relevance: Making Competitors Irrelevant (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass, 2011). See David Aaker’s book for an industry perspective of branding strategies in the twenty-first 
century.  
 15 Aaker, Brand Relevance, 18. 
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itself, grow its audience, and become more relevant. Though it is doing so in an existing 
category with already strongly branded, relevant players including Netflix, Amazon, and 
legacy broadcast VOD websites, and with ties to existing categories of linear television 
channels. Presently, in contrast to Netflix, Hulu’s branding strategies are not only 
targeted directly for consumers, but also specifically for its advertisers too, as examined 
in more detail in the next section. 
ADVERTISING CREATED FOR ADVERTISING AGENCIES 
 As discussed in the prior chapters, Hulu distinguishes its platform from Netflix 
because it maintains advertising in two of its three watching options (traditional Hulu and 
Hulu Plus’s cheaper tier). To engage advertisers – something that Netflix does not worry 
about – Hulu distributes advertisements targeted and tailored to them. One such 
advertisement from 2015, titled “Hulu Reaches Millennials,” features Hulu’s Peter 
Naylor, SVP of Ad Sales.16  
                                                




Figure 2: Hulu Reaches Millennials17 
Naylor is standing in a crowd of twentysomethings. Everyone in sight is playing on his or 
her cell phone. As Naylor turns around, he looks up from his phone, addresses the 
camera, and says he is “hanging with his millennial friends.” Here Naylor plays the 
unaware, out-of-touch, middle-aged corporate executive character, mislabeling social 
media platform usage, “snapfacing” instead of snapchatting, and “instabooking” rather 
than instagramming. Throughout the advertisement, text bubbles pop up next to Naylor’s 
body, representing what the surrounding millennials are texting/tweeting/communicating 
about while he speaks. Naylor lists statistics on advertising, millennials, and Hulu’s 
subscriber base. To persuade advertisers, he announces Hulu’s key demographic: 
millennials. “It’s a very important demo, these 18-34 year olds. Did you know they make 
up more than half of Hulu subscribers? ...According to comScore 92% of these guys say 
they skip ads when watching shows on recorded television.”  
                                                
 17 Ibid. 
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In the background, text bubbles chime up with “#skipsalot” or “yep,” showing the 
millennials featured in this commercial while stand-ins for actual millennials with 
Naylor’s claims. Further engaging advertisers, Naylor lists why advertising with Hulu is 
more desirable than advertising on network TV: “It’s a good thing Hulu’s ads aren’t 
skippable… and we only charge you for ads that are viewed to one-hundred percent 
completion.” “cantskip” “dontskip” “wontskip” pop up in the background. Since 
advertisers are concerned about DVR and on-demand fast-forwarding capabilities, Hulu 
carefully notes, fast-forwarding and avoiding ads is not an issue with their platform. 
Should users figure out how to avoid ads, Hulu will not charge advertisers. As such, Hulu 
sets up a desirable platform for advertisers and makes the case for this desirability in 
advertisements like this one. As Naylor persuades viewers (here meaning advertisers) to 
contact a Hulu sales representative, he also introduces a trailer for “the second season of 
our critically acclaimed, Hulu original, Deadbeat [2014-].” As the trailer ends, the 
camera reveals the previously featured group of millennials along with Naylor watching 
the trailer on a tablet. The group laughs and begins to tweet and text “#deadbeat” 
“#cantwait” “#lolzzzz.”  
Overall, this two minute commercial for advertisers reinforces Hulu’s relationship 
between the content they feature, their platform, and advertisers desires: Hulu’s platform 
appeals to millennials, Hulu’s original content also attempts to appeal to millennials, 
advertising on Hulu is made appealing because millennials have no choice but to watch 
them, and millennials will engage with the content and thus, in turn, have the potential to 
watch/buy/engage with whatever products the advertisers display. Put simply, Hulu spins 
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the value of its original content for advertisers, meaning, advertisers are considered 
throughout the acquisition and distribution process in a way that Netflix avoids. This is 
common knowledge for television executives who are aware of how specific content will 
or should (theoretically) attract specific audiences. Advertisers willingly and eagerly link 
their products to this content. TV matches content to advertisers, who match their product 
to these imagined demographics. This process of matching advertisers to content to 
audiences has been a common practice in linear and cable television for decades. It also 
aligns with Ivan Askwith’s break down of the industry’s constructed process of 
engagement.18 Hulu’s engaged millennial viewers (who are forced to watch an ad) 
increase the odds that a viewer will be exposed or persuaded by an advertisement. 
Netflix, in contrast, imagines a different type of audience and cultivates a distinctive 
brand identity, through engagement. Netflix’s content is designed to support a more 
expansive brand, which caters to wider range of subscribers (and, of course, ideally to 
shareholders as well).   
ADVERTISING CONTENT FOR SUBSCRIBERS 
 Netflix builds and fine-tunes promotional tools within its platform to engage 
current subscribers, especially those who visit the site less regularly, and also to promote 
the breadth of the company’s original programs. Banner art and trailers work as 
advertisements to “casuals” within the platform. Casuals, as defined by scholar Henry 
Jenkins, are people who “watch a particular series when they think of it or have nothing 
                                                
 18 See Askwith, “Television 2.0,” 23. 
 110 
better to do.”19 From Netflix’s perspective, casuals– who oppose or overlap with zappers 
who “flit across the dial” or, in this case, across the web and loyals who “give themselves 
over fully” to shows – have a more likely potential to watch more content and become 
more frequent users.20 Netflix uses acquired data to customize these advertisements and 
cater to individual user preferences, thereby boosting content engagement and turning 
casuals into loyals, who are dedicated to shows, or power users, who use Netflix to its 
most advanced capacity (rating shows, watching hours of content, curating a queue, etc.). 
Variety correspondent Janko Roettgers writes that these marketing tools are simple and 
exist to answer the following question: “Are users more likely to stay engaged, and 
maybe extend their free trial to become paying subscribers, or are they going to cancel 
their service? In other words: Are they going to add to the growth of the company?”21 
Todd Yellin, Netflix’s SVP of product innovation, confirms, “We are not out to make 
cool bells and whistles for power users.”22  
                                                
 19 Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York: New 
York University Press, 2008), 74. 
 20 Ibid. 
21 Janko Roettgers, “Distributing ‘Daredevil’: The Technology Behind Netflix’s Latest Global TV 





Figure 3: Netflix Originals Cover Art Example23 
Market research tests, such as testing different customized cover art and trailers, 
and monitoring big data are meant to grow the company and expose infrequent users to 
the breadth of their content. As Yellin states, the tests are not meant to cater to existing, 
loyal customers (power users) or “make cool bells and whistles” for them. Rather, the 
tests are meant to turn casual users into more frequent power users. The second season 
premiere of Daredevil (2016) experimented with such marketing tests. Netflix designers 
created eight cover art images, randomly shuffled per user. Netflix watched results, 
picking the best performing cover art (presumably, the art people engage with most 
frequently), and used that particular art for all subscribers. Prior to the Daredevil release, 
                                                
 23 Janko Roettgers, “This Simple Trick Helped Netflix Increase Video Viewing by More Than 20 
Percent,” Variety, January 7, 2016, http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/netflix-ab-tests-image-
optimization-trick-1201674325/. 
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chief product officer Neil Hunt reported a twenty to thirty percent viewing increase when 
specific title art was chosen by a subset of viewers.24 As seen in Figure 3 (above), Netflix 
Originals banner art can highlight particularly interesting characters or settings, spinning 
the show for audience groups in its attempts to persuade subscribers to keep clicking 
“Play.” Importantly, too, Netflix Originals are explicitly branded with the red Netflix 
logo on the upper left corner. Personalized banner art attracts audiences and reinforces 
the Netflix Originals brand, as audiences “watch Netflix.” 
Quantifying engagement may help Netflix increase the odds of success of an 
original series. Though the company can sustain itself on continuous subscribers, Netflix 
seems to believe, as made apparent by these marketing tests, that engagement leads to 
loyal subscribers. Netflix has conducted similar tests with original content teaser trailers 
featured on the site. House of Cards season one (2013), for example, featured ten 
different trailers from different cuts of footage (now unavailable to the public), catered to 
different audiences based on their past viewing habits.25 Netflix also attempted 
personalization based on time of day, but found that most viewers binge watch 
(presumably one show at a time). As a result, viewers are looking to continue watching 
whatever television show they have already started, rather than looking to watch cartoons 
on Sunday mornings or movies at night.26  
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These trials and tests show Netflix’s attempts to improve user experience while 
promoting engagement. Within Askwith’s break down of engagement, and through my 
updated steps, Netflix’s cover art trials and trailer tests attempt to influence step two’s 
process: “The viewer decides to watch a television program.”27 For Netflix, 
accomplishing step two would encourage the engagement process as viewers then 
potentially go through steps three-six: become engaged, become a regular/loyal/binge-
viewer, become passionate and share their passion for the program, increase the viewer’s 
feelings of enjoyment as connected to Netflix, which spill over and serve the company’s 
larger aims of maintaining monthly subscribers. Netflix’s strategy, as of the mid-2010s, 
uses big data and test trials to personalize and promote products to subscribers, which 
helps the company maintain and even grow its subscription numbers. Netflix constructs 
that narrative about itself, increasing its brand relevance, by releasing this type of 
information through interviews with the trades and popular press.  
ADVERTISING PLATFORMS 
 Netflix and Hulu advertisements run on linear television as well as on online 
video sites like YouTube. Advertisements promoting their platform and original 
programs are examples of both companies directly presenting their branding strategies to 
engage and sustain audiences. Hulu’s fall 2015 commercial, “Hello from Hulu,” 
advertises both available and upcoming content [South Park (1997-) and The Mindy 
Project (2012-)], Hulu’s commercial-free subscription option, Hulu’s connection with 
                                                
 27 See pages 68-69. 
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Hollywood content producers, and Hulu’s connection with their audiences.28 The 1:22 
minute commercial features a young, attractive, white male spokesperson who acts as a 
stand-in for a company executive and directly addresses the audience. The spokesperson 
enthusiastically lists TV shows, illustrating knowledge of the platform and its features. 
He allows the audience to access the “TV shows (South Park and The Mindy Project 
specifically) they love” by taking them on a tour of Hulu headquarters. He reads audience 
tweets, notifies actress Mindy Kaling about the renewal of the fourth season of The 
Mindy Project, and thanks the audience for their active engagement and posts about the 
show on Twitter. He indicates such activity helped to save the show after Fox canceled it. 
After scrolling through a tablet, presumably reading Mindy Project fan tweets begging 
Hulu to save the show, he says to Kaling, “You’re back!” She asks, “On Hulu?” “On 
Hulu!” he says, to emphasize excitement and mark Hulu’s brand as the savior of adored 
programs. The spokesperson, functioning as more than just an accessible executive stand-
in, in fact becomes an advocate for the audience and their passions. In so doing, he 
displays that Hulu is in touch with their (imagined) audience and with the interests of the 
existing fans and audience of The Mindy Project. A statement he makes at the conclusion 
of the ad reinforces this: “The shows you love, we love.”29  
This statement can be interpreted in two ways. One, that Hulu is responsive: Hulu 
is in touch with its audience’s tastes and listens to their feedback. Two, that Hulu is 
strategic: Hulu’s business model latches on to established shows, brands, and talent with 
                                                




built-in, pre-existing audiences in an attempt to guarantee viewership.30 The “Hello from 
Hulu” advertisement illustrates how Hulu addresses audiences though a lens informed by 
its stakeholders: Hulu balances a “viewer-friendly” brand while showing broadcast and 
cable television continuities in its business and marketing practices. 
As a point of comparison, it is helpful to look at an advertisement produced by 
Netflix a year before “Hello from Hulu,” in 2014. In a manner that similarly merges their 
business model with a branding strategy geared to their own aforementioned imagined 
audience, Netflix employs British comedian Ricky Gervais as a model for acceptable 
watching behaviors in their “Superfan” advertisement.31 The commercial begins with the 
title card to House of Cards and Gervais, from his couch, addressing the camera, “You 
know when you’re watching your favorite Netflix show and after five straight episodes, 
it’s like, you want to be in it?” During the course of the commercial, Gervais binge 
watches Netflix’s original programming, ostensibly demonstrating and normalizing such 
viewing behaviors in the process. Netflix, through Gervais, thereby encourages binge 
watching.  
Quickly, though, the commercial constructs boundaries and rules around TV 
watching. Gervais imagines himself participating in the narratives of Netflix’s original 
series. He visits the fictional universes for the service’s shows, including House of Cards, 
Lilyhammer, and Orange is the New Black. Doug Stamper, a main character, corrects his 
grammar in House of Cards, he is stared down by Lilyhammer star Steven Van Zandt, 
                                                
30 This has been done throughout TV history, through spin-offs primarily. 
31 Netflix, “Ricky Gervais - ‘Superfan’ - Netflix Commercial - EMMY 2014 - HD,” YouTube, 
August 25, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0SZv2vPdj6g. 
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and several Orange is the New Black characters threaten him in a prison scene. Following 
this sequence of events, Gervais sits back on his couch and laughs, declaring “Maybe I’m 
better off just watching.” Gervais’s final statement becomes a way that Netflix models 
that there are limits to participation with its service.  
Watching multiple episodes in a row and being engrossed in the story is 
encouraged, but participating in the narrative, confusing fantasy and reality, and deviating 
from the story’s official canon is taboo in terms of Netflix-accepted viewing practices. In 
recent years, TV marketers consider industry-constructed fans – ones that play within the 
official canon – as a viable (and consuming) audience. Historically and presently, fannish 
audience members have been linked to conceptions of “excessive” fans, pathologized, or 
considered obsessed by industry and the press. That perspective is acknowledged in this 
advertisement, when Gervais wants to participate in Netflix’s original series narratives. 
Scholar Joli Jensen writes on two historically common portrayals of fans, as either the 
obsessed individual or the hysterical crowd.32 Jensen suggests that fandom is seen as a 
“social dysfunction” and these two types of fans are an inherent “critique of modernity.”33 
Ideal audiences, for Netflix, are engaged through industry-approved channels: Netflix’s 
official accounts on Twitter or Facebook, promoting the show through word of mouth, 
watching more content, and renewing their subscription. Gervais models excessive 
behavior and “poaches” the texts for his own use. Then, reigned in by the industry, warns 
                                                
32 Joli Jensen, “Fandom as Pathology: The Consequences of Characterization,” in The Adoring 
Audience: Fan Culture and Popular Media, ed. Lisa Lewis (London: Routledge, 1992), 9. 
33 Ibid. 
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against its practice, telling ideal audiences to remain engaged and watching, but through 
official channels. 
 Both Hulu and Netflix’s commercials reveal the companies’ efforts to construct 
audiences and coach them to act in certain ideal ways. These ideal ways are in 
accordance with their larger corporate goals, business models, targeted audiences, and 
brand identities:  Netflix reveres binge-watchers while Hulu reveres audiences that love 
existing TV shows. Netflix’s binge-watchers are power users, in keeping with their 
subscriber model, these power users reduce churn. Hulu, maintaining an audience of TV 
lovers, shows that its business straddles the goals of linear and nonlinear television. 
Hulu’s acquisition of The Mindy Project serves as an ideal instance, as Hulu encouraged 
weekly viewing. 
ORIGINAL CONTENT ACQUISITION AND PLATFORM-CONSTRUCTED NARRATIVES 
 The Mindy Project, produced by Universal Television, 3 Arts Entertainment, and 
Kaling International, and distributed by NBCUniversal Television Distribution, debuted 
on Fox broadcast network in September 2012. The show aired on the network for three 
seasons until Fox canceled it in May 2015.34 When Fox announced its cancellation, the 
trade press, popular press, and fans circulated rumors that Universal Television was in 
talks with Hulu. As Variety explained at the time, The Mindy Project’s cancellation 
evokes “another fan-favorite comedy resurrected online: Community” a show cancelled 
by NBC and picked up by Yahoo Screen. When, just days after Fox cancelled it, Hulu 
                                                
34 Elizabeth Wagmeister, “’The Mindy Project’ Cancelled: Fox Comedy May Return to Hulu 
After Season 3,” Variety, May 6, 2015, http://variety.com/2015/tv/news/the-mindy-project-cancelled-fox-
hulu-1201489438/. 
 118 
announced that the fourth season of Mindy would debut on the streaming platform, it 
marked Mindy as the first show Hulu agreed to save. Hulu was widely hailed by the 
media and fans as saving the project. Hulu’s SVP and head of content, Craig Erwich said, 
“With so many of her fans already catching up and tuning in to the series on Hulu, we 
know her millions of fans will be eager to find out what Mindy has in store for the next 
chapter.” Creator, writer, and star Mindy Kaling said in an official statement, “I am 
thrilled The Mindy Project has found a new home on Hulu, where so many of our fans are 
already watching the show. It’s such an exciting place to be.”35 The Mindy Project is an 
ideal example of a program with an existing (if imagined) audience moving to another 
platform, especially from network broadcast to digital streaming platform, and an 
example of Hulu satisfying the already present “Mindy on Hulu” audiences. 
 As seen above in the quotes from Erwich and Kaling, when a shows’ renewal is 
threatened, the industry and surrounding discourse frequently uses the word “fans” both 
to describe the community actively advocating for a show’s renewal, and the affective 
relationship between the audience and text. These moments of a show’s uncertainty bring 
up interesting issues of fan as viewer and consumer, and fans’ status in relation to the 
industry. Christina Savage’s research on the “save our show” campaigns around the NBC 
show Chuck (2007-2012) provides an illustration of fans of Chuck using their power to 
                                                
35 Todd Spangler, “’The Mindy Project’ Moving to Hulu for Season 4 After Fox Cancellation, 
“Variety, May 15, 2015, http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/the-mindy-project-moving-to-hulu-for-
season-4-after-fox-cancellation-1201497556/. 
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influence industry decision making.36 When fans feared for Chuck’s cancellation in its 
second season, online fan forums posted recommendations and calls to action for the fan 
community, including writing letters, watching the show, buying the DVD box set, and 
preordering the season’s DVD box set. Famously, fans bought footlong sandwiches from 
Subway (one of Chuck’s sponsors) and left comment cards telling Subway the sandwich 
was purchased in support of Chuck. This strategy showed “both the network and the 
sponsor that there was not only an audience for the show but also an audience that was 
paying attention to the advertising for the show and supporting those sponsors.”37 While 
Savage does not wholly link NBC’s decision to renew Chuck for a third season with the 
Subway campaign (she contextualizes the decision with pressures from critics, 
advertisers, and the production company), fans’ actions contributed to the industry’s 
decision. This particular “save our show” campaign strategy is a direct example of 
Askwith’s engagement model, consciously deployed, showing fans’ power as a 
commodity.38 
 My focus is not on a save our show campaign for The Mindy Project, but rather, 
Hulu’s categorization as “savior” of The Mindy Project, Hulu targeting Mindy’s existing 
fan base to construct an audience, and their conscious effort to thank the fans for saving 
Mindy. “Save our show” campaigns, like Savage illustrated, create powerful promotional 
discourse for networks, advertisers, and stakeholders. I aim to break down how SVODs 
                                                
 36 Christina Savage, “Chuck Versus the Ratings: Savvy Fans and ‘Save Our Show’ Campaigns,” 
Transformative Works and Cultures, no. 15 (2014), 
http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/497/427. 
 37 Ibid. 
 38 Askwith, “Television 2.0.” Smythe, “On the Audience Commodity.” 
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use this “save our show” discourse to publicly promote their original programing. In the 
case of The Mindy Project, Hulu co-opted “save our show” discourse to promote Hulu’s 
fan-friendly model and place power with audiences. First, I broadly survey Netflix and 
Hulu’s sequels, prequels, and extensions. This is followed by how SVODs construct and 
promote their own definition of acceptable fan practices, and a case study of social media 
discourse around Hulu saving Mindy. 
 Both Netflix and Hulu primarily rely on programming that already has been pre-
sold and appeals to what are perceived to be largely “built-in” audiences. Their respective 
slates are heavy on sequels, prequels, and extensions of ongoing motion pictures and 
television series, similar to linear TV’s enduring spinoff strategy. For example, Wet Hot 
American Summer: First Day of Camp (2015) is a case of Netflix distributing content 
based on the known appeal and established reputation of existing franchises.39  Wet Hot 
American Summer, the 2001 film, already had built a strong cult audience before Netflix 
ordered it to series in 2014. The original film previously appeared to stream on Netflix, 
so the company had existing data on the film and its stars, which implied its potential 
prequel appeal. The film, which spoofed teenage sex comedies such as Meatballs (1979) 
and Little Darlings (1980), was neither a financial nor critical success but it developed a 
cult following. Many of its stars (including Paul Rudd, Amy Poehler, and Bradley 
Cooper) became popular Hollywood film and television stars following the film’s release. 
In May 2014, Netflix announced an eight-episode prequel series chronicling the camp 
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day leading up to the film’s setting. First Day of Camp features the original cast, director, 
and writer (David Wain and Michael Showalter). 
Netflix’s list of spin-offs and extensions include many other shows as well, 
including new seasons of Arrested Development (2003-), The Killing (2011-2014)8, 
Fuller House (2016-), and a four-part season of Gilmore Girls (2016). The 
aforementioned shows were part of Netflix’s streaming library, testing their popularity 
with existing users. While The Killing demonstrates the platform picking up a show in 
(almost) real time,40 consistent with a traditional cable television calendar, with regard to 
the other original series listed here, a considerable amount of time elapsed between their 
airdates and Netflix’s efforts to revive them. Hulu’s acquisition of The Mindy Project, 
happening closely after its public cancellation announcement, creates a causal narrative, 
where the company is explicitly constructed as the central agent. Here Hulu is the savior, 
though The Mindy Project aired on one of Hulu’s parent companies’ broadcast networks, 
Fox. In contrast, Netflix’s reboots, sequels, prequels, and extensions are more drawn out 
over time and Netflix’s status is less of a savior and more of an added benefit and/or 
nostalgic indulgence. In contrast to the narrative of Hulu as savior, the narrative built 
around Netflix is that the company offers more – namely, more content. The time elapsed 
between the original airdates for Netflix’s series and the arrival of new episodes allows 
the streaming platform to assess its existing data and then evaluate the show’s potential 
success based on that data as well as the audiences it wishes to appeal to. Picking up the 
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show must have seemed like a safe bet to the company, again exemplifying their 
publicized reliance on big data. This brand strategy ultimately portrays the message that 
the company understands and caters to its subscriber base. As Forbes writer Jackson 
McHenry observes, “These buys are typically based less on viewing numbers than 
creating a comfortable, comprehensive user experience.”41 An experience, I argue, based 
on engagement and appeasing proven audience groups, fans in particular. 
Social Media Engagement: Cultivating Acceptable Fan Practices 
 Demonstrated through the Chuck “save our show” campaigns and in the issues of 
fan/industry relationships theorized by Bertha Chin and Matthias Stork, particular fan 
practices and communities are increasingly mainstream and entangled with industry. 
While first-wave fan scholars such as Henry Jenkins and Camille Bacon-Smith focused 
on resistant reading practices,42 which are valuable in discovering the breadth of fan 
practices, it is important to note that many examples of current fan production, such as 
creating memes and gifs that quote canonical scenes, are not resistant in relation to the 
dominant positions offered by the original texts. Industries privilege fans that engage and 
create within the official canon. As theorized by Joli Jensen, fans have been linked to 
conceptions of “excessive” consumption, pathologized, or considered obsessed by 
industry and the press. That perspective is acknowledged in the aforementioned Netflix 
advertisement, when Gervais wants to participate in Netflix’s original series narratives. 
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While the Gervais example promotes this pathology, Netflix and Hulu social media 
campaigns complicate it. Both companies have twisted these excessive portrayals of 
fandom into something more positive, a marketing and branding strategy for their 
businesses. Such an approach is in keeping with the growing economic and cultural 
valuation of fans by the media industries. And, since Netflix both admonishes fans for 
being “superfans” like Gervais, and awards them for participating on Twitter, it reveals 
the indistinct, subjective relationship between industry and audience. 
Both streaming services encourage viewers to consume more programs in the 
interest of helping subscribers perceive the value of maintaining their monthly 
subscription. Particular fan behaviors (sharing on social media, word-of-mouth 
marketing, watching content) that promote these goals are valued by video-on-demand 
industries. SVOD platforms seek to appeal to viewers in a variety of ways, including 
through their content libraries, promotional materials, and with original programming. 
The platforms create an environment purposefully catering to their conception of fans – 
viewers with sustained love for a media text and, consequently, that text’s distribution 
platform. While Netflix’s end goal is to appeal to all audiences with a range of content, 
catering to a particular audience segment – fans – may seem counterintuitive. 
Simultaneously, Netflix also seeks to reduce churn. Netflix’s appeal to fans and watching 
behaviors is part of the latter, maintaining subscriber numbers. Hulu appeals to fans 
through their library of reruns, encouraging active engagement on social media (modeled 
through advertisements and marketing documents), and saving The Mindy Project. 
Netflix explicitly encourages excessive watching (binge-watching) in order to create and 
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sustain a loyal subscription base, akin to producing a loyal fan community, but with a 
decidedly industrial bent.  
The media industries generally, and SVOD services such as Netflix and Hulu in 
particular, reclaim and reconfigure behaviors once portrayed as pathological. Both 
conceal their business motives (turning a profit) by marketing excessive watching and 
acceptable fan practices (remaining within the show’s canon) sincerely. In the process, 
they build their legitimacy by poaching communication methods previously customary to 
fan cultures. The platforms share digital marketing materials (memes, videos, and gifs) 
on their social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr), betting on the fact that 
their audiences will be familiar with other forms of online culture like social media 
websites. Also, since these streaming services are relatively young, they are able to 
experiment with new ways of advertising and promoting shows both within their 
platforms and beyond them in order to find what works, in the process setting a precedent 
for future SVOD original programming and marketing practices. 
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Netflix and Hulu’s Social Media Practices 
 
Figure 4: The Mindy Project’s Official Webpage on Fox.com43 
The Mindy Project’s online presence for seasons one through three was visible 
through an official webpage on Fox.com. The website remained publicly available even 
after the show moved to Hulu. The page highlights visually oriented posts, providing 
options for viewers to reply, retweet, or favorite posts. When Mindy moved to Hulu, 
social media posts were similarly visual, but branded with the Hulu logo, showing the 
norms of social media practices in the television industry. The Mindy Project’s official 
                                                
 43 “The Mindy Project,” Fox, May 19, 2015. http://www.fox.com/the-mindy-project. 
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Fox page circulated screenshots from the show, along with gifs, promotional images, 
quizzes, and behind-the-scenes stories about the production of individual episodes. All of 
these items are attributed to Fox. Fox’s most recent post on the page (and last post before 
the move to Hulu) is a copy of a tweet from The Mindy Project’s official Twitter page, 
“We love #TheMindyProject anywhere we can get it! Watch Season 3 here before Mindy 
moves to @hulu.”44 Viewers replied to the post, calling the network on its contradictory 
remark by replying, “if @FOXTV actually loved it then you would never have canceled 
it!!...Thank goodness for @hulu @huluplus #saviour” and, “um maybe don’t cancel the 
show next time, Fox. #protip.”  
While certain viewers may not acknowledge the case-specific, complicated 
considerations that factor into renewing or cancelling a show (such as how time slots 
influence a show’s performance, how a show fits with other programming on the channel, 
audience viewership numbers, and more), it is clear the promotional materials and trade 
press influenced the narrative that Hulu “saved” the show and swayed some fans to 
disbelieve Fox. Apart from this discourse, it is important to reiterate that Fox is a 
corporate owner of Hulu. Even though Mindy fans discredited Fox, in the end Fox 
maintained distribution of the show, just through a different medium. 
By calling Hulu and its subscription service Hulu Plus a “#saviour,” audiences of 
The Mindy Project are positioned to see Fox as the bad guy and Hulu as the good guy, or 
more broadly, to view (linear, old) broadcast networks as negative and (nonlinear, new) 
                                                
44 The Mindy Project, Twitter post, May 19, 2015, 1:15 p.m., 
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VOD services as positive. This increases Hulu’s branded image as audience-friendly. The 
narrative presented by trade press and TV critics continues the “Hulu as savior” rhetoric. 
For example, Deadline reported in August 2015, “Hulu stepped in to save the series…”45 
A May 2015 headline from Wired claimed, “Proof that Fans Rule TV Now: Hulu Saves 
The Mindy Project,” and continues, “Thank the Internet. The real winner here is you.”46 
While this is only a small sample of headlines, these few represent a general popular 
narrative circulated at the time. By picking up a show with an existing fan base, Hulu 
wisely burnished its image as catering to its subscribers – “smart fans” – and showed 
itself to be playing the hero. The service encouraged The Mindy Project’s pre-existing fan 
community to flock to Hulu Plus for a subscription – the only way to access season four – 
and pay for what they might have watched “for free” (broadcast) before. This rhetoric is 
employed for branding purposes; to increase audiences positive associations with Hulu 
and to advertise where audiences can find Mindy season four. It is also an example of an 
SVOD platform using “save our show” rhetoric to boost their branded image. Many VOD 
platforms are behaving similarly by positioning themselves as saviors to cancelled shows 
(e.g., Netflix’s renewals and Yahoo saving Community). As these platforms begin to 
develop more original television programming, this turn to pre-sold content is a safe 
programming strategy and a very savvy branding choice to gain subscribers and allies 
                                                
45 Ross A Lincoln, “Mindy Kaling ‘Grateful,’ ‘Really Emotional’ That Hulu Saved ‘The Mindy 
Project,’” Deadline, August 9, 2015, http://deadline.com/2015/08/the-mindy-projectmindy-kaling-hulu-tca-
1201496274/. 
46 Julia Greenberg, “Proof That Fans Rule TV Now: Hulu Saves ‘The Mindy Project,’” Wired, 
May 15, 2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/05/proof-fans-rule-tv-now-hulu-saves-mindyproject/. 
 128 
with press and viewers. Platforms are building trust, introducing new products while 
maintaining previously vetted audience favorites.  
Hulu’s official promotional materials for The Mindy Project included Facebook 
and Twitter social media feeds – perhaps in an attempt to cater to a desired demographic, 
millennials. The Mindy Project’s latest episodes are housed on hulu.com, but primarily 
the hulu.com space provides official episode descriptions and makes other television/film 
suggestions catered to the user’s watching habits. Hulu’s official social media feeds on 
Twitter and Facebook share promotional materials, similar to the aforementioned Fox 
page. Occasionally, the Hulu Twitter page retweets a fan’s photo of an official Mindy 
Project promotional item. The Mindy Project’s official promotional materials draw use 
official hashtags and contain jokes from particular scenes to continue discussion of the 
show throughout the week. These promotional materials explicitly belong to Hulu and 
The Mindy Project, conveyed through the logos on the images/gifs/videos.  
In November 2015, after it had appeared on Hulu for one month, The Mindy 
Project was a People’s Choice Awards finalist for the second-ever Favorite Streaming 
Series award. The show was nominated against three Netflix shows and one Amazon 
show – Orange is the New Black, House of Cards, Transparent, and Unbreakable Kimmy 
Schmidt. To show appreciation and solicit votes, The Mindy Project’s Facebook page 
post first thanked the “#MindyOnHulu” fans, then linked to the voting website, and 
included a gif of Mindy covering her face with the caption “Are you kidding?”47 By 
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directly thanking fans and including this particular gif, the official page talks like Hulu’s 
ideally constructed viewer: using the beloved text itself to communicate gratitude. Gifs 
are frequently used in fan communities to convey something beyond words, with the 
image of a character and line from the show corresponding to everyday life. The clash of 
real life and fictional show meet when conversing with gifs, or using gifs to enhance 
communication, showing the user’s mastery of the text. Thus, The Mindy Project’s 
Facebook account, using a gif from its show and thanking its fans, shows sincerity and 
authenticity by modeling ideal styles of communication. 
Similarly, Netflix encourages and models ideal styles of communication to 
engage with their target audiences and promote their brand identity through specific 
original content. The official Orange is the New Black (OITNB) Twitter page hosts a 
weekly hashtag called “On Wednesdays We Wear Orange” 
(#OnWednesdaysWeWearOrange). The hashtag encourages viewers to publicly display 
their love of the show by wearing a piece of orange clothing or finding an orange object, 
taking a photo, and post it on social media with the hashtag. The official Twitter page 
retweets a few of these photos every Wednesday, ranging from orange pens, orange cats, 
orange nails, or orange OITNB t-shirts. Most of the photos retweeted by the account 
feature more than an orange object, also showing the user doing something related to 
OITNB such as watching the show in the background, wearing fan-made clothing items, 
listening to the OITNB official album, or mentioning a line from the show in the tweet. 
One OITNB fan participated by creating her own fingernail polish art on a background of 
orange. Details of the intricate nail art include allusions to Alex Vause’s glasses and the 
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prison uniform worn on the show. The acknowledgement to these practices that comes 
from the official Twitter page means this type of digital, industry-constructed fannish 
production (creatively incorporating the show into one’s daily life) is favored.  
This weekly Twitter campaign serves to promote the show throughout the year. 
This helps counter the unique marketing challenge posed by Netflix’s binge model of 
distribution. Instead of week-to-week gradual building of an audience, Netflix must work 
to maintain hype for the show. #OnWednesdaysWeWearOrange is key to sustaining the 
hype year-round, while also modeling engagement practices that directly relate to the 
show. The hashtag encourages fans to keep thinking about OITNB every week, not just 
during the days after it airs or the weeks after new seasons are made available by the 
service. This shows Netflix’s struggle as it simultaneously tries to break from the weekly 
broadcast television model and attempts to recreate it online through continuous, weekly 
social media engagement strategies. 
While the aforementioned campaigns, official hashtags, and promotional 
materials developed by Netflix have, overall, been successful, a particular attempt at 
engaging audiences did not translate as positively. Over Labor Day 2015, Facebook 
promotional posts encouraged viewers to “Get locked up with #OITNB this Labor Day 
Weekend.”48 A corresponding video on Facebook showed a clip from the series involving 
part of the cast watching television in the prison’s recreation room. Instead of the 
television show watched in that particular episode, there is a photoshopped image of 
                                                
48 Orange is the New Black, Facebook post, September 3, 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/OITNB/videos/406947932835315/. 
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“Netflix Labor Day Weekend.” The commercial shows a drawing (Figure 5) of one of the 
main characters, Alex, dressed up as Rosie the Riveter. Alex/Rosie is drawn saying, “3 
days, 3 seasons. You can do it!”  
 
Figure 5: OITNB Labor Day Binge Advertising Campaign49 
From this commercial, Netflix is trying to either encourage rewatching of the 
seasons or build new viewers who will watch all of OITNB while they have a few days 
off of work. However, since this Labor Day binge was promoted on their own social 
media platforms, new (or potential) Netflix users or non-subscribers probably were 
unaware of the promotional campaign. While this campaign tried to cater to audiences – 
in particular, fans as defined by Netflix – who were willing to spend their long weekend 
binging the show and presumably watching the seasons again, top commenters on the 
                                                
 49 Ibid. 
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post revealed something else. Before watching the video, many Facebook users thought 
the “Get locked up with #OITNB” subtitle was referring to season four being leaked 
early. Other commenters claimed, “anyone that watches Orange has already watched 
season 3 the first 2 days it was out,” and “They were already streaming on Netflix lol.” 
Commenters on Netflix’s own site wanted new seasons – and when mislead to believe 
there were new seasons available – rewatching previous seasons became less appealing, 
an inadequate substitute. The “locked up” tagline and “excessive watching event” were 
not effective for existing OITNB fans that simply wanted to watch new material. Those 
who posted on the site felt this event underestimated their dedication to the show, 
commenting to prove that they watched season three as soon as it premiered.  
With this example, Netflix wanted to promote conversation during OINTB’s off-
season. However, the campaign showed their misunderstanding of fan viewing behaviors 
and engagement. At least based on the comments posed on the site, Netflix’s actions 
adversely affected an established relationship, fracturing their appeal to fannish viewing 
behaviors. The Mindy Project “save our show” example and resulting social media 
campaign demonstrates the potential of co-opting social media strategies traditionally 
ascribed to fans to build fan engagement – and, through OITNB’s Labor Day commercial, 
their potential to backfire as well. It shows the difficulties that can emerge when a 
company’s imagined conception of fans or a particular audience does not align with the 
actual viewers’ complex means of engaging with the content. 
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CONCLUSION 
 A few key themes emerge from these case studies of advertisements, social media 
posts, and public narratives of content acquisition. These case studies allow for a greater 
understanding of how the companies’ business models translate into particular branding 
and programming strategies. Netflix and Hulu both link engagement with subscription 
retention. This is part of a larger industrial narrative that engagement practices, 
traditionally linked to fan groups, are helpful in maintaining audiences and building 
affective relationships. Ultimately, brand strategies seek to concretize and grow 
engagement, subscriptions, and affect. Though how truly affective these strategies are, 
for Netflix and Hulu, remains hidden.  
Secondly, marketing content and advertisements from Hulu and Netflix reveal 
stakeholder influence. The two companies draw from legacy industry business models 
and marketing practices, privileging certain types of imagined fan audiences and 
engagement behaviors in the service of building and sustaining brands. Hulu exists amid 
old Hollywood legacy media companies, advertisers, and new technology. Netflix, 
though influenced by new technology, partially relies on practices (creating trailers, 
focusing on sequels and extensions, weekly Twitter events) common to linear television 




 The Netflix Switch. Make your own. Share your ideas.1  
 
Figure 6: The Netflix Switch2 
 One of Netflix’s official webpages, Makeit.netflix.com, lists two real, Netflix-
related technical crafts. The website serves as a genuine do-it-yourself, Netflix-affiliated 
project page, beginning with a company prototype for “The Netflix Switch.” When a 
Netflix subscriber is ready for a night in, the Netflix Switch prepares the subscriber’s 
living room with ideal lighting, silences phone notifications, orders takeout, and turns on 
Netflix. The website includes authentic, detailed instructions to make one’s own Netflix 
Switch: system diagrams, materials, and schematics. While the original Netflix Switch 
encourages users to create a distraction-free environment, get comfortable on the couch, 
                                                
1 Netflix US & Canada, “The Netflix Switch,” YouTube, September 28, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTlIGdlbTy4. 
 2 “The Switch,” Netflix, accessed April 28, 2016, http://makeit.netflix.com/the-switch. 
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and prepare themselves to watch Netflix for hours, the website also urges users to “think 
bold” and create a unique switch for their own purposes. Netflix’s suggestions include, 
“Something that allows you to queue episodes from different tv shows, then play them in 
that order, like a ‘Thursday Night Lineup’ option. If Netflix gave me a little positive 
affirmation when I’m home alone on a Friday night binge watching House of Cards. 
[sic]”3 Their brand strategy encourages network TV-style scheduling (Thursday night 
lineups, or at least, dedicated weekly viewing patterns), SVOD binge watching, 
subscriber-platform interaction, and user personalization. Though the page encourages 
personalization, it also places limits on watching behaviors and strongly suggests ideal 
watching habits.   
The Netflix Switch’s cross-section of technology, television, 
excessive/personalized viewership, and interaction gets at the heart of Netflix’s publicly 
constructed business model. The Netflix Switch constructs a certain mode of ideal 
viewing, while revealing Netflix’s tech-based stakeholders and business model’s 
priorities: do-it-yourself watching, influenced by Netflix’s branded content, and within 
Netflix-determined boundaries. It incites a type of crafty, fan-influenced (building 
prototypes) engagement with their brand.  
The Netflix Switch, among other examples listed in chapter three, reveals 
company goals and desired audience relationships. One goal of this thesis was to survey 
and further understand the business practices of two popular SVOD companies that began 
distributing original content in the 2010s: Netflix and Hulu. Both Netflix and Hulu are 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
 136 
considered SVODs, though these two companies are owned and operated quite 
differently. The differences between them impact how they consider their audiences, with 
Hulu catering to advertisers and Netflix pleasing shareholders. The content these 
companies have chosen to distribute, analyzed alongside advertising and marketing 
practices, also marks differences between them.  
Netflix continues to associate its brand with a new, technology influenced start-
up. It emphasizes big data to brand itself as personalizing its service to individual users. 
However, since the company is so secretive about its numbers, their utilization of “big 
data” is carefully chosen to promote “guaranteed success” for its original content and 
content as “perfectly customized” to its subscribers. In reality, its broad range of content 
and emphasis on creating loyal or power users enables its strong brand, thus increasing 
audiences’ tendencies to identify the brand itself – watching Netflix. The “binge” model 
promotes excessive watching behaviors through modeled advertisements and content 
release schedules. All of these attributes help differentiate its product from linear 
broadcasting. To be sure, linear, legacy television companies have influenced Netflix. For 
example, Netflix continues to draw from the same talent pool as the television industry, it 
competes and works with television companies to bid for its original content, its 
television shows are formatted like broadcast and cable television (though watched 
differently over time and not interrupted by advertisements), the company inserts itself 
within the television industry to compete for the same awards, and has cited broadcast 
and cable networks as competition (as detailed in chapter one).  
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In comparison, Hulu’s brand, content, stakeholders, and target audiences are more 
varied. This is largely due to the number of groups and interests it is attempting to satisfy. 
The company remains situated in between legacy and new television industries, as it is 
owned by three of the major media conglomerates but also competes with streaming 
television content, and includes a subscription option without commercials. Hulu appeals 
to a broad audience, though some of its original content and advertisements are aimed 
specifically at millennials. Hulu values engagement, while also promoting and attempting 
to enforce linear television viewing patterns with its episodes airing weekly, interrupted 
by commercials. 
Within my analysis of Hulu and Netflix’s discourse, larger cultural and industrial 
questions emerge. These include first, how do new technologies and, thus, new business 
models and emergent strategies, threaten legacy companies? As a case study, Hulu 
reveals legacy companies’ attempts to engage with new technologies: its in-between 
status is the product of these relationships and dynamics. Netflix’s discourse as direct 
competition (seen through NBC’s audience ratings discourse about Netflix in chapter 
two’s section “How Competitors Define Viewership”) shows the surrounding legacy 
media companies’ anxieties about SVODs. Second, how does the industry – as their 
anxieties are expressed through the trades, popular discourse, and corporate reports – 
create and group audiences accordingly? Seen through Netflix and Hulu’s strategies, 
there is an increased focus on engagement in the interest of maintaining subscribers. This 
heightened focus on engagement proliferates throughout the industry. Audiences are 
grouped based on engagement, and data attempts to quantify engagement, valuing it more 
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highly than viewership. Third and finally, how do these practices create larger cultural 
narratives about television? Industry, trade, and popular trade press work alongside – and 
respond to – Netflix and Hulu’s brand strategies to add to our cultural understandings of 
television. The emphasis on SVODs disrupting linear television, creating quality, 
personalized, and diverse original programming creates a particular narrative in the 
2010s. 
 By examining industry corporate documents, promotional advertisements, social 
media feeds, and trade press articles, this study has been designed to parse industry 
rhetoric. Over the past several years, both academics and popular press journalists have 
written about the potentiality of both companies to disrupt the broadcast network and 
cable television business models.4 Overall, however, I found both companies are 
upholding and challenging broadcast and cable television. Netflix has been perceived 
primarily as distributor of quality original content, while Hulu has been portrayed as 
trailing behind Netflix in its efforts to build its own originals library. As Netflix and Hulu 
continue to build their own original content libraries, Hulu caters to advertising and 
weekly release schedules. Netflix has the most potential to disrupt the legacy television 
industry, though acquiring reruns of past TV seasons continues to be a major part of its 
content library.  
In considering both Netflix and Hulu’s ties to television networks, this study has 
enabled me to look past the rhetoric of disruption as it surrounds two mainstream 
                                                
4 Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized. Alan Wolk, Over the Top: How the Internet Is 
(Slowly But Surely) Changing the Television Industry (Lexington, KY: Independent Publishing, 2016). 
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streaming services. Instead of claiming to forecast the future of these companies, this 
thesis ultimately has sought to dig through their pasts, tracking their business structures 
and original content origins. Netflix and Hulu’s business models and relationships with 
legacy companies are critical in setting up predictions. Setting up these foundations, 
surveying business models, and understanding stakeholders enables future studies to 
further analyze these two companies.  
 Studying contemporary media distribution services means confronting a constant 
influx of new material to research. As these companies develop new programming, 
acquire fresh content, and move into new markets, there are new issues to analyze. Thus, 
there are many paths to follow for future studies. Upcoming original content lineups from 
Netflix and Hulu, for example, show potential for future research. In particular, Netflix’s 
forthcoming talk show, Chelsea, hosted by comedian Chelsea Handler, offers the 
potential to complicate our understandings of SVOD original television and consumption 
patterns. The show, scheduled to premiere May 2016, will air thirty-minute episodes with 
no commercials three days a week (Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays) on the 
streaming service.5 In Handler’s Chelsea announcement, she wrote that past episodes will 
continue to be saved and available for Netflix users. This is different from how content is 
made available on Hulu or broadcast/cable TV websites, where only the past few 
episodes are publicly accessible. Chelsea will be the first Netflix show released with 
weekly episodes. While audiences have the potential to binge watch (waiting a few 
                                                
5 Patrick Hipes, “Chelsea Handler’s Netflix Talk Show to Debut May 11,” Deadline, March 16, 
2016, http://deadline.com/2016/03/chelsea-handler-netflix-talk-show-debut-date-1201721395/. 
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weeks, then catching up with Chelsea), the concept of Chelsea rejects standard generic 
trait of the talk show format – time sensitive segments on current events and celebrities 
promoting upcoming movies, books, or TV shows. I wonder how Chelsea will react to 
and exploit the Netflix format and, potentially, contribute to the creation of talk show 
segments less dependent on when a viewer watches the episode. I am also curious to see 
how audiences watch Chelsea, and especially, how Netflix advertises and markets ideal 
watching habits in relation to this show.  
Meanwhile, Hulu’s slate of upcoming or recently launched original programs 
includes The Path (an hour long drama, starring Aaron Paul of Breaking Bad), Chance (a 
drama series based on a book, starring Hugh Laurie and directed by Room’s Lenny 
Abrahamson, ordered for two seasons6), and Shut Eye (a drama series, starring Jeffrey 
Donovan). After one Golden Globe nomination for Hulu Original Casual, I am curious to 
see how the 2016-2017 award season plays out in terms of Hulu, Netflix, and Amazon 
Prime’s original content rivalry, and how the trade press pins the three against each other 
and legacy companies. As the three services continue to invest in original content 
distribution, how will cable and broadcast television respond? 
 Future research might also Netflix’s international context, specifically, how the 
company promotes, distributes, and labels original content across the globe. Netflix has 
plans to distribute and expand original content for an international/transnational context 
[see Club de Cuervos (2015-), Narcos (2015-), and Marseille (2016-)]. Hulu, at this time, 
                                                
6 Nellie Andreeva, “‘Chance’ Drama Series Starring Hugh Laurie Lands 2-Season Order At 
Hulu,” Deadline, January 6, 2016, http://deadline.com/2016/01/chance-seriesg-hugh-laurie-star-hulu-
1201676912/. 
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remains solely a U.S.-based platform. If Hulu decides to expand and offer access or 
subscriptions to other countries, it could reach higher subscription numbers and boost its 
perceived popularity and success. Studying comparable platforms around the world and 
surveying national responses to the Netflix’s expansion are important to consider going 
forward. Additionally, studying other platforms’ original content distributions strategies 
is necessary to expand my argument that owners, shareholders, and company higher-ups 
contribute to the SVOD decision-making process. Amazon Prime is, arguably, an equally 
important player in the SVOD landscape and has an interesting background. Its video 
service is a perk packaged alongside their free shipping model. Once a bookstore, then an 
“everything store,” Amazon sells individual TV episodes and films, and features a 
streaming library for subscribers. Amazon Studios began acquiring and then streaming 
original content on the website in 2010. Much of its original content, including 
Transparent (2014-), Red Oaks (2014-), Mozart in the Jungle (2014-), and Man in the 
High Castle (2015-), is critically acclaimed, vying for awards alongside Hulu and Netflix.  
Also of interest is YouTube’s move into a paid subscription service. In 2014, 
YouTube began their YouTube Red subscription service; the company began distributing 
original content exclusively available to subscribers in 2015. YouTube subscription perks 
include ad-free streaming as well as exclusive films and series that (generally) star 
YouTube personalities, including horror/reality series Scare PewDiePie (2016-) and sci-fi 
comedy film Lazer Team (2015).7  Joining Amazon, Netflix, Hulu, and YouTube, in 2016 
                                                
7 Julia Greenberg, “With Its New Original Series Youtube Asks: ‘What Netflix?,’” Wired, 
February 10, 2016, http://www.wired.com/2016/02/youtube-red-originals-netflix/. 
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Apple announced plans for an unscripted series about the mobile app economy.8 While 
critics pointed out the promotional spin of the show and its ties to branded content, it will 
be interesting to see how Apple promotes and distributes the show, how the content will 
be available to consumers, and if the content is purely promotional for the Apple App 
Store.9 In addition to original television shows, Netflix, YouTube, and Amazon Prime 
have distributed original-branded films [Beasts of No Nation (Netflix, 2015) and Chi-Raq 
(Amazon, 2015)], comedy specials [Hannibal Buress: Comedy Camisado (Netflix, 
2016)], and documentaries [Tig (Netflix, 2015) and A Trip to Unicorn Island (YouTube, 
2016)]. A study of their different distribution process, business plans, criteria for success, 
and audience goals should be conducted in relation to film industry practices.  
 Regretfully, thus far there has been little research on the perception of Netflix and 
Hulu from audience perspectives. I am interested in future studies researching how 
audiences imagine and engage with these platforms. I think this is important work in that 
it grants agency to audiences; attempts to understand complex watching patterns; actively 
seeks to make sense of the ways audiences engage with, reproduce, critique, and modify 
the platforms and their original content; and tries to comprehend how audiences 
conceptualize the similarities and differences between platforms (i.e., if they subscribe 
multiple services, what do they use each platform for, do they engage in different viewing 
practices with each platform, etc.). Future studies could also examine fan productions and 
                                                
8 Emily Steel, “Apple’s First Foray Into Original TV Is a Series About Apps,” The New York 
Times, March 24, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/business/media/apples-first-foray-into-
original-tv-is-a-series-about-apps.html?_r=0. 
 9 Ibid. 
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audience interactions with platforms and programs’ official social media accounts, 
investigating if and/or how audiences are performing the types of “acceptable” 
engagement that Netflix and Hulu promote – and when and how they are doing 
something different than the platforms prescribe. 
 Since its inception, television content, technologies, and viewership have been in 
flux. Statistically, as of 2016, there are more shows on television than ever before, more 
ways to access these shows, and more people engaging with and/or watching 
programming. This is an exciting time to study television, as we are at a moment of both 
technological transition and perpetuation – as cable, satellite, and broadcast continue to 
be relevant. The business decisions made by Netflix and Hulu – and how they convey 
these decisions through their corporate documents and engagements with the press – 
influence and contribute to specific cultural narratives. This is why it is important to start 
with studies, such as this one, that look into the foundations of an emergent industry 
sector. It is critical to understand how companies such as Netflix both build on and set 
new precedents, how they differentiate themselves in relation to established media 
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